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This article concerns the legitimacy of various legal schemes for dealing with
abortion. Legitimacy in one sense is secured simply by complying with the
formal criteria for valid law-making: enactment within power and in due
form. But jurists have learned (or re-learned) that more can be said about
legitimacy, without betraying the purity of their discipline by moralizing and
advocacy. From this development in jurisprudential thought emerges the
range of questions and criteria deployed in the present study.
Max Weber discerned three types of legal legitimacy: that deriving from the
sacredness of tradition; that deriving from the charisma of saviours, prophets or
heroes; and that deriving from the rationality of general rules'. In the last-
mentioned case, there stands behind every official and legal act "a system of
rationally discussable 'grounds', that is, either subsumption under norms or
calculation of means and ends' 2. Formal rationality is content to subsume
particular cases under general norms; but unrestricted rationality demands
that the general norms themselves should have more than traditional or charis-
matic authority, and so subjects all legal material to the substantively rational
co-ordination of means with ends3. Now jurisprudence is committed, at the
very least, to unrestrictedly rational discussion of legal materials and legal
experience. So a society in which jurisprudence is a socially recognised discipline
is likely to be or become one in which the principle of legal legitimacy is
substantive rationality in Weber's sense. The raising of theoretical questions
about law and legitimacy breaks the spell of pure tradition or mere charisma4 .
In modern Western societies, jurisprudence is a recognised discipline and
legal legitimacy is sought to be measured by rationality. Official acts of admini-
stration or legislation are questioned, and in response are legitimated by appeal
to more general norms and higher ends. These societies exist in a real tension
towards the ideal of substantive rationality in law. Jurisprudence, in the pursuit
of its own rational questioning, and without imperilling its purity, can examine
* LL.B. (Adelaide), D.Phil. (Oxon.), Fellow and Praelector in Jurisprudence,
University College, Oxford. This paper is a revised version of a chapter in John
T. Noonan (ed.), The Mortality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives
(Harvard University Press, 1970).
1. Rheinstein (ed.), Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (1954), 336; also
xxxix-xlii.
2. Id. at 355.
3. On the distinction between substantive and merely formal rationality, see Weber,
op. cit. supra n.1 at 63-64, 351-356; also Rheinstein's intro., xlvui-lx. "Unrestricted
rationality" is not a Weberian category.
4. See Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (1952), 59. On the inadequacies
of Weber's analysis of substantive rationality and charisma, see Talcott Parsons,
The Structure of Social Action (1937), 658-672.
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actual legal material and proposed legal projects in the light of this working
ideal. This is not to say that the most general norms and ultimate directive
ideals of Western society are derived from, or justifiable by, jurisprudence. It is
simply to say that even a jurisprudence which prides itself on rigorously restricted
analysis of mature Western legal systems will have absorbed into its account
many of the techniques, conceptual structures, distinctions and procedures by
which those systems strive to secure a working rationality in the co-ordination
of ends and means and in the concretization of general principles and values5.
Such a jurisprudence can examine actual and proposed schemes for regulating
abortion and assess them in terms of that working rationality, if nothing more.
That is our present purpose, and in carrying it out we shall set out in turn
three model schemes of legal regulation of abortion. At this point we shall
characterize the three only roughly and, as will be seen, insufficiently:
1. the prohibition of all abortions, except where the life of the mother is
threatened;
2. the permission of abortion when previously authorised, by independent
officials, under defined but ampler categories of medical, psycho-medical
or quasi-medical conditions;
3. the permission of all abortions save those performed by persons unqualified
to carry out the medical procedures involved.
1. The "rights of the child": strict criteria and ex post facto control
by criminal law.
The first scheme of regulation is that which until very recently prevailed
throughout the English-speaking world and much of the continent of Europe6 .
In this scheme, the inducing of abortion is prohibited, under penal sanction,
except where the life of the mother is in danger, or at most, her health
threatened with imminent, grave and lasting impairment 7. In various juris-
dictions the width of these exceptions is uncertain; to interpret them it is
necessary to know the accepted objectives of the scheme. These objectives and
5. An obscure sense of this seems implicit in John Austin's doctrine that analytical
jurisprudence should concern itself with "the ampler and maturer legal systems".
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 367 (ed. H. L. A. Hart, 1954).
If law were to be regarded simply and solely as sovereign command, it would
be difficult to see how it could be more (or less) mature at one time or place than
at another.
6. The law under the Abortion Act 1967 (U.K.) and the Criminal Law Consolidation
Act Amendment Act 1969 (S.A.) seems to us to be approximate to the third model
scheme, for reasons discussed in the text infra at nn.5 9 -62 and in nn.59, 78 and
Appendix A. For the law in most European states, see Rateau, "Etude de Droit
Compar6 sur l'Avortement dans Quelques Pays Europfens" [1959] Rev. Int. de
Droit Penal 265. On the new South Australian legislation, hereafter referred to for
convenience as the "Abortion Act" 1969 (S.A.), see Appendix C.
7. Where an exception to the general prohibition is admitted in favour of the health
of the mother as well as of her life, the first scheme becomes more or less unstable,
depending on the strength and content of medical ethics and the interpretation
put on the law by the medical profession and the public. In England, a vaguely
defined exception was admitted under R. v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687, in favour
of the mother's mental health, but the scheme was saved from collapsing into a
permissive scheme of the third type by the cautious attitude of the medical pro.
fession: see Bernard Dickens, Abortion and the Law (1966), 98-100. But when the
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values do not appear unambiguously from a mere statement of the formal
criteria for lawful abortions. That is why our rough classification of the three
model schemes, by reference mainly to the breadth of those formal criteria,
needs modification and amplification. Again, in a number of European juris-
dictions there exist exceptions in favour, not only of the life and health of the
mother, but also of eugenic (i.e. in respect of presumed malformation of the
child) and "ethical" (i.e. in respect of pregnancies by rape or incest) indications.
If not too many questions are raised about the principle on which these excep-
tions are based, their existence seems compatible with the first scheme (as well as
with the second or third)'; but the raising of these questions is liable to make
the first scheme seem incoherent in its principles and objectives, and so gradually
to topple it over into the third scheme. However, the defined grounds for lawful
abortion within a scheme are less directly relevant to a jurisprudential
discussion than are the general objectives of the scheme and the appointed
techniques of deciding, policing, sanctioning and adjudicating in the light of
those objectives. So we shall not here spell out precisely the exceptional grounds
for abortion that may or may not be compatible, in a more or less anomalous
fashion, with the first of the three model schemes.
To understand any of 'the three model schemes, and their approximations in
actually operative schemes, it is better to proceed straight to the root questions:
What is the point of this scheme? Does it secure its objectives in a rational way?
The main objectives of the first scheme seem to be two: (1) the protection
of children in the womb from destruction: (2) the protection of the mother
from bungling operators. In short, the life of unborn children and the health
of mothers are the main values that the scheme seeks to realise; the general
principles or norms under which it can be subsumed are that the life of such
persons should not be taken, and that people should not be permitted to risk
their lives for inadequate cause.
The difficulty of formulating the last-mentioned principle without begging
the question immediately reveals that in this scheme the first objective must be
primary, and the second objective secondary and in part subordinate and
dependent 9. For people are generally permitted to risk their lives for adequate
exception is judicially defined, as per Menhennit J. in R. v. Davidson [1969] V.R.
667, 672, as one in favour of honest belief, on reasonable grounds, that abortion is
necessary (and "proportionate to the need" [quaere: what does this add, or mean?])
to preserve the woman from serious danger to physical or mental health (not being
merely the normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth [quaere: could an illegiti-
mate birth present a "normal" danger to mental health?])-then we can say that
by judicial legislation, the third scheme has replaced the first.
8. Cf. infra n.16. See Rateau, op. cit. supra n.6 at 287-88. Not least because of their
comparative rarity in practice, the "ethical" and eugenic indications are com-
patible with the second scheme, but only if not too many questions are raised
about their integration into medical ethics, which at present has not perhaps
absorbed them: see Report of the Committee of the British Medical Assoc. [19661
(2) British Medical Journal 40, 42: but cf. infra Appendix A, nil1. And in
the third scheme they are virtually redundant; the Abortion Act 1967 omits the
"ethical" indication because it is catered for by the "mental health" indication: see
Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) 13th July 1967, cc.11 74-1178;
Abortion Law Reform Association, Guide to the Abortion Act 1967 (ed. Potts,
with commentary by Glanville Williams: 1968), 11.
9. Courts and writers who maintain that the primary objective of the first scheme is
the protection of the mother misunderstand the scheme; the prevalence in any
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reasons; so the postulated inadequacy of abortion as a reason for risking one's
life must be explained in terms of the undesirability (at least relative) of killing
the unborn child-and this is the undesirability with which the first objective
or value or principle is concerned. (Notice that this argument in no way depends
on any assumption about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of this legislative
scheme in achieving its second objective).
The primary objective of this first scheme is to be interpreted as a particular
modality of a more general principle of mature Western legal systems: that all
human life is to be free from deliberate or negligent attack. The assertion that
the objective of the scheme has generally been the maintenance of a sufficient
birthrate scarcely bears historical examination1 ° . In any event, a scheme so
motivated would be unstable and liable to abandonment in the event of social
embarrassments by overpopulation. So here we shall consider this scheme of
regulation in its stable form, as motivated primarily by concern for human
personality and hence for the person of the unborn.
Now the law can attain its ends in a variety of ways, of which taxation, civil
or tortious liability, and criminal or penal liability might conceivably be
relevant. In fact, it is always the last-mentioned technique that has been
employed in this scheme of abortion regulation". Is it a reasonable technique?
That jurisprudence can differentiate concepts such as "tax", "tort" and
"crime" is a mark of its partnership in Western rationality12. Indeed, modern
society of such explanations forebodes the collapse of the first into the third scheme.
See the comments in Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality and Religion in a Secular
Society (1967), 81, on the remarks of Goddard L. C. J. in R. v. Tate, The Times
22 June 1949.
10. See Dickens, op. cit. supra n.7 at 11-15. Population policies influenced the growing
severity of French law from 1914 to 1945, but abortion was a considerable crime
long before the genesis of these policies: Bouzat, "La Politique Criminelle Frangaise
en Matibre d'Avortement et de Propagande Anticonception-nelle" in Les Principaux
Aspects de la Politique Criminelle Moderne, a tribute to H. Donnedieu de Vabres
(1960), 183. See also infra n.92.
11. The law can grant a civil action in tort to the husband whose marital interest in
the life of his child has been invaded by the secret actions of his wife and her
abortionist: cf. Touriel v. Benveniste 30 U.S.L.. Week 2203 (Los Angeles Sup. Ct.,
1961); "Comment" 110 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 908; 14 Stanford
Law Review 901 (1962). But it is hard to see what other civil actions would
usefully be available in respect of the abortion itself; the child is usually dead,
the mother a consenting party. Cf. George, "Current Abortion Laws: Proposals
and Movements for Reform", 17 Western Reserve Law Review 371, 388-390
(1965). Note that J. B. George Jr. also suggests treating abortion "within the
framework of civil provisions affecting the medical profession rather than the
penal concepts of the criminal code", id. at 397. But such a civil scheme would
still have to approximate to one or other of our three model schemes, and would
still require penal sanctions against abortions performed by persons outside the
medical profession. And to try to hold the medical profession to the first scheme
only by professional disciplinary prceedings would (a) weaken the symbolic force
of the law, (b) place on the disciplinary procedures a r6le they are not structured
to discharge either efficiently or with due process, (c) place on the profession an
excessive burden in deciding a controverted social question. Note: all the articles
on abortion in 17 Western Reserve Law Review may now be found in David T.
Smith (ed.), Abortion and the Law (1967).
12. "Western rationality" is not meant to deny rationality to other cultures, but simply
to indicate conveniently a form of thought and culture familiar to us all. Oi
the more general question see Eric Voegelin, Order and History (1957), esp. vol. 2,
pp.10-24.
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analytical jurists, such as H. L. A. Hart, have denounced as inadequate any
jurisprudence, such as Hans Kelsen's, that in the name of scientific and value-
free purity hesitates to differentiate such concepts because their differentiation
turns on value-laden differences of function 13 . For Hart, attention to such
functional differences is 'the very mark of a fruitful jurisprudence. Yet such
distinctions were not always drawn, and spring directly from the rational
demand for justification in terms of norms and values'4 . Now the classical
Western notions and justifications of penal action are today commonly declared
to be obscure. So if our present question is to be answered jurisprudentially, a
few clarificatory remarks and even definitions seem to be in order here15.
In the fully developed concept of "crime", and act or forbearance will be
criminal in a strict sense only if it is taken to manifest an indifference to, and
thus publicly to affront, all or some of a considerable set of values upheld by
society. "Prosecution" and "punishment" are stages in society's attempt to
vindicate those values. "Vindication" is the process by which "good" citizens
are encouraged in their habitual readiness to prefer the socially approved values
implicit in the law to any competing value. Vindication involves also the
instructing of the teachable in the approved ramifications of those values, the
deterring of the recalcitrant, and the reform of the amenable. Above all,
vindication is the binding-together of this complex of aims and processes into
the distinct general form of punishment: a meeting of manifested waywardness
of individual will by manifested subjection of that will to the will of those
responsible for upholding the values which society prefers but to which that
individual has failed to give due weight.
It is not too difficult to discern the range of values with which penal law is
concerned. There is the value of the welfare of the individual injured by the
crime, and the supporting value of respect for that welfare; there are the
values directly or indirectly constitutive of human welfare-life, sociability,
property, truth-telling, procreation, etc.; there is the value of doing as you
would be done by, and the value of fairness to other members of society who
put themselves out to uphold the social values; and there is the general value of
giving priority in one's activity to the common good of which one's own good is
a dependent component.
The criminal law, with the penal process, is the symbolic drama by which
the socially preferred range of values is vindicated against indifference and
affront. Education is one of its principal aims, from which flows many of its
characteristics. Thus it is not every killing of one human being by another that
attracts the criminal sanction, but only those killings that are deemed to
13. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 38-39 (1961). For Kelsen's doubts about thejurisprudential ultimacy of the distinction between tort and crime, see Kelsen,
General Theory of Law and State 50-56, 207 (1945). Holmes's doubts were less
nuanced: "The Path of the Law", 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 461 (1897).
14. The theoretical differentiation of a specifically criminal law within the body of
delictual law is perhaps to be ascribed to Plato, Laws 862-863; see A. E. Taylor's
Everyman translation (1960) intro, at xlvii, and text at 250-252.
15. Elements of the following account will be found in Rodes, "A Prospectus for a
Symbolist Jurisprudence" 2 Natural Law Forum 88, 105-115 (1957). The back-
ground in recent German and American criminology is traced in Eser, "The
Principle of 'Harm' in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the
Criminally Protected Interests" (1965-6) 4 Duquesne University Law Review 345.
See also Walter Moberly, The Ethics of Punishment (1968), ch. 8.
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manifest an indifference to the value of human life (i.e. by intention or
negligence). This attention to the value-choices and value-rejections symbolised
by individual actions, rather than to the actions simply as movements-plus-
consequences, is a classical instance of Western rationality reflecting on the
grounds for social reaction to undesired events. Again, the grading of crimes
and punishments signifies the approved ranking of the values threatened by
crime; and the grading of degrees of culpability recognises that while negligence
symbolises little more than human weakness, direct intention and wilfulness are
assertions and expressions of available alternative horizons of values. "Evil
communications corrupt good manners", and intentional and successful crime
tends to "bring the law into contempt".
It is, of course, a main aim of the criminal law to eliminate undesired
conduct. But the criminal law is not futile if it succeeds in doing little more
than manifesting society's continuing commitment to its preferred values.
Examples of such laws are many-laws against speeding, against perjury, against
domestic murder, against prostitution, once upon a time against duelling, and
now against certain forms of racial discrimination. Such laws are to be con-
trasted with laws that not only fail to eliminate the forbidden conduct, but also
are so widely and publicly flouted by respected men that they lose even the
character of symbolising a real societal commitment to the values they purport
to uphold. These laws are pointless, and their limping continuance symbolises
the impotence not the supremacy of the officially approved values. Prohibition
in the U.S.A. was such a case.
The first scheme of abortion regulation, then, is an effort to suppress
abortions in all but a few cases, and to witness society's commitment to the
value and inviolability of human life. (The very nature of the admitted
exceptions16 witnesses an effort to distinguish between life as such-the life
of the mother-and mere qualities of life such as peace of mind, standard of
living, avoidance of shame, etc.) The basic commitment, jurisprudence itself
cannot evaluate; jurisprudence is a partner in Western rationality, not a
summation of it. Nor can jurisprudence itself comment on the minor premise:
that early foetal life is simply a modality of human life. Suffice it to say that
the fully self-conscious jurist may feel the attraction of both premises. It was no
accident that the first great theoretical jurist, Plato, also first elaborated the
Western idea of the soul as the centre of what we now call personality17. For
jurisprudence is a sustained and questioning reflection on certain human per-
formances, and a fully reflective jurist will include his own performance as a
jurist within the scope of his reflections. So doing, he may well apprehend
that the mysterious organizing centre of his life's work, of his concern for
truth, of his actual insights and of his will to reflect, lies beyond the capacities
of his merely material constitution, however much the latter may be a
sine qua non. He may conclude that what makes him the person he is, and
confers on him any worth he may have, is in the last analysis not a mere
16. That is, respecting the life of the mother; it is at this point that the compatibility
of the eugenic and "ethical" indications with the first scheme is put in question.
17. Of course, it is also true that Plato, like other Greeks, approved abortion on racial
eugenic grounds. Western humanism does not fully develop until the equality of
all individual souls is grasped, historically as a result, it seems, of Christ.
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function or correlate of his size or shape, of the rhythm of his sleeping and
waking, growing and fading.
Still, it is schemes of regulation, not their premises, that lie within the
competence of jurisprudence, and we have now sufficiently set the stage for a
jurisprudential evaluation of the rationality of the first scheme of abortion
regulation.
Is this scheme effective in suppressing abortion? An unbiased answer to this
question will be very circumspect. On the one hand, there is much reason for
saying, No. At this point we must venture on the first of a number of statistical
discussions, and it is as well to point out that the figures for illegal abortions
are everywhere very unreliable, and inferences from any abortion statistics
rather uncertain' s. For example, the great majority of commentators in recent
American law journals' 9 accept that 1,200,000 is a plausible estimate of the
number of abortions per annum in the United States. But on examination it
appears that this figure has no other basis than a study published in 19342o--
according to which it may be assumed that there is one illegal abortion for
every 3.55 live births. And this latter figure is simply an extrapolation from the
case-histories of 10,000 women who attended the Margaret Sanger birth control
clinic in New York City between 1925 and 1929! Another widely accepted
figure for the United States is 600,000 per annum-this by extrapolation from
the case-histories of the women who volunteered the information in Kinsey's
famous study of female sexuality (a group which included a negligible pro-
portion of negroes and Catholics, and which was unrepresentative even of urban
white women) 21. Statisticians who study the evidence agree that the number
may be between 200,000 and 1,000,000, and that there is no way of determining
the number more closely than that22. Similarly, estimates of illegal abortions
in the U.K. before the Abortion Act 1967 ranged between 50,000 and 100,000
(250,000 was occasionally mentioned); but on the basis of fairly reliable
statistics for maternal deaths, C. B. Goodhart was able to argue plausibly that
the figure might in fact be as low as 10,000 per annum23. In South Australia,
18. See the remarks in Tietze, "Induced Abortion and Sterilization as Methods of
Fertility Control" (1965) 18 Journal Chronic Diseases 1161.
19. There is a good bibliography in (1968) 40 University Colorado Law Review 297,
Appendix B.
20. M.. E. Kopp, Birth Control in Practice (1934), quoted by Frederick Taussig,
Abortion Spontaneous and Induced (1936), 368, and used as the basis of his
calculations at 25-26.
21. See the comments by the Statistics Committee of the 1957 Planned Parenthood
Federation of America Conference on Abortion, on the Kinsey Institute's study
(i.e. Gebhard et al., op. cit. infra n.30), in Mary Calderone (ed.), Abortion in
the United States (1958), 178.
22. Comments of the Statistics Committee, op. cit. supra n.21 at 180.
23. Goodhart, "The Frequency of Illegal Abortion" 55 Eugenics Review 197, 200
(1964)., Criticism in Dickens, op. cit. supra n.7 at 79-80. The Minister of Health
estimated that in 1964, 75,000 cases of abortion were treated at National Health
Service Hospitals, of which 3,300 were therapeutic and 3,000 septic: [1967] (1)
British Medical Journal 577. Up to 20% of all conceptions result in spontaneous
abortion, i.e. miscarriage, and ma.ny of these would call for hospital care. (In
1964 there were about 850,000 live births). Sir Dugald Baird, "A Fifth Freedom?"
1966) 58 Eugenics Review 195, 204, estimated that the incidence of therapeutic
abortion in Aberdeen, with a very liberal medical profession, was about 2% of
all maternities; illegal abortions he thought very few, because septic abortions were
very rarely seen in Aberdeen. In 1964 legal abortions in Denmark were about
5% of live births; in Hungary they were about 135%: see infra, Appendix B.
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estimates have ranged between 250 and 10,000; the Abortion Law Reform
Association of South Australia estimates that 5,150 to 8,900 abortions are
performed on South Australian women each year 24. Suffice it to say that even
the mean of the latter figures, 7,000 per annum, is hard to accept: it would
mean that there would be one clandestine abortion for every South Australian
woman, on average, over her whole life 25 (and since many women are not in
the market for abortions, it would mean the remainder, many scores of
thousands of women, are averaging two to three or more abortions each during
their lives). Indeed, ALRASA's figures are among the most remarkable ever
published; transposed to the U.K., the suggested range of figures would be
equivalent to 216,000 to 375,000, which far exceeds the most extreme and
unrepresentative estimates made for the U.K. in the polemics preceding the
1967 Act 26 .
Still, whatever figures are accepted, the fact remains that the numbers
everywhere are rather high, not least because of the activities of qualified
medical practitioners. On the other hand, before examining other aspects of
the phenomenon of abortion, it will be in order to offer a few general cautions
about the apparent effectiveness of the criminal law in this age. For in this age
"the overflowing of criminality" has affected all parts of Western civilization.
In England and Wales both the number and the rate of indictable crimes known
to the police have multiplied more than tenfold in this century2 7 ; yet in 1965
Leon Radzinowicz was willing to hazard that "crime fully brought into the
open and punished represents no more than about fifteen per cent of the
total' 2 s . But would it not be perhaps a little hasty to declare the criminal law,
as a whole, redundant
29?
One can accept any of the previously quoted estimates of the incidence of
abortion in countries using the first scheme of regulation, and yet find reason to
believe that the scheme is effective in suppressing, though not eliminating,
abortion. It is agreed that when in 1939 Denmark and Sweden adopted the
second scheme (legal abortion by official permission under fairly wide con-
ditions), there was a sharp increase in the number of both legal and illegal
24. See Report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the Criminal
Law Consolidation Act Amendment Bill 1968, para. 18 (1969), and Appendix
B, at 95.
25. This assumes a thirty-year child-bearing period for the 222,900 women between
the ages of 15 and 45 (in 1966).
26. In 1969 there were about 42 times as many women between 15 and 45 years old
in England and Wales as in South Australia. Note that if 7,000 S.A. women are
aborted annually, the rate of *illegal abortions per woman of child-bearing age
and per live births is as high in South Australia as the rate of legal abortions in
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia, where abortion is freely available. This
seems unlikely, especially in view of the fact, noted by A.L.R.A.S.A. in their
evidence to the Select Committee, that countries such as the afore-mentioned ("less
sophisticated countries") are "in a pre-contraceptive era" compared to Australia:
op. cit. supra n.24 at 101.
27. McClintock and Avison, Crime in England and Wales (1968), 23-24.
28. Radzinowicz, Ideology and Crime (1966), 64.
29. Professor Packer has said: "We can have as much or as little crime as we please,
depending on what we choose to count as crime": Packer, The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction (1969), 364. As a response to the problem of social order in
this age, the slogan is less than adequate.
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abortions30 . Twenty years later, while the number of live births in Denmark was
about twenty-five per cent higher than in 1939, and the population about
twenty per cent higher, legal abortions had multiplied tenfold and the number
of illegal abortions seemed to be anywhere between twice and fifteen times as
high as in 193931. And where the third scheme (virtually unconditional
permission of all abortions performed by qualified physicians) has been adopted,
as in Eastern European countries during the last decade, the total number of
abortions has risen so sharply that the increase is generally agreed to be
responsible for at least part of substantial, even dramatic, decreases in the
birthrate 32 . Thus in Hungary, a steady or rising birthrate of 23.0 per 1,000
population in 1954 was converted, after full legalisation of abortion in 1955, to
one that dropped about one point each year until in 1962 it was only 12.933.
In 1964 the number of lawful abortions was over 184,000 (in a population ot
about 10 million)-far above any estimate of the number of all legal and
illegal abortions under the old regime of rigorous regulation 34. Similar, though
not so marked, effects are observable in countries such as Poland 35 Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia and Russia, not to mention Japan 36 . After nine years under
the third scheme, Rumania reverted to a version of the first scheme in 1966,
largely (it was said) because of the effect on the birth-rate. The Rumanian
legislators certainly knew what they were doing. The birthrate rose from 13.7
in the fourth quarter of 1966 to 38.4 in the third quarter of 196731! A more
striking demonstration of the efficacy of penal law could not be devised. We
have set out various statistics relating to some of these countries in Appendix B.
Making all allowances for the difficulty of isolating causal factors, it can hardly
be doubted that the transition from the first to the second or third schemes of
legal regulation is liable to be accompanied by marked increases in the total
number of abortions. In this sense, the first scheme of regulation is effective in
suppressing abortion, thought not in eliminating it.
Is this scheme effective in symbolising society's commitment to protecting the
value of human life against deliberate or negligent affront? It seems clear that
30. See Skalts and Norgaard, "Abortion Legislation in Denmark" (1965) 17 Western
Reserve Law Review 498, 505; Gebhard, Pomeroy, Martin and Christenson,
Pregnancy, Birth and Abortion (1958) 221-229. The remarks of the last-mentioned
source are played down in Bates and Zawadzki, Criminal Abortion: A Study in
Medical Sociology (1964), 137, 141.
31. Skalts and Norgaard, op. cit. supra n.30 at 519; Glass, "The Effectiveness of
Abortion Legislation in Six Countries" (1938) 2 Modern Law Review 97, 117,
quoting estimates of the Danish Governmental Committee on Abortion (1936).
In 1964 there were 3,936 legal and an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 illegal abortions,
in a population of just over 4,600,000.
32. Tietze, op. cit. supra n.18 at 1167; Mehlan "Combating Illegal Abortion in the
Socialist Countries of Europe" (1966) 13 World Medical Journal 84, 87. Com-
petent observers of Japan have come to the same conclusion: Blacker, "Japan's
Population Problem" (1956) 48 Eugenics Review 31; Samuel, "Population Con-
trol in Japan: Lessons for India" (1966) 58 Eugenics Review 15, 19.
33. See infra Appendix B, table D.
34. See Tietze, op. cit supra n.18; Mehlan, op. cit. supra n.3 2.
35. On Poland, see also Wolinska, "Assumptions Faced with Reality: Marginal
Remarks on the Conditions of Permissibility of Abortion Act of 27th April, 1956"
15 Pansto I Prawo 282 (Polish Academy of Sciences, 1960) (English summary,
1960 (1), 507).
36. See works cited supra n.32.
37. Tietze and Lewit, "Abortion" (1969) 220 Scientific American 21, 25. See also
infra n.92.
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the answer must be: Yes. Unless one were to contemplate a prohibition of
all abortions whatever, it is difficult to conceive of any other legal treatment
of the sphere of maternity that could witness this commitment to the value of
human life. One cannot expect empirical sociology to produce estimates of
the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of such symbolsUS--what is at stake is the long
haul of civilization, which even in retrospect the cultural historian can assess
only by a wisdom that must do without checks or control groups and the
apparatus of scientific certainty 9 .
It is, however, permissible to wonder whether the lower numbers of abortions
under the first scheme than under the second or third schemes are kept down
only by the purely deterrent effect of the legal sanctions, so relatively rarely
invoked 40, or whether the symbolic weight of the law's denunciation is perhaps
contributing too. One can meditate, too, on the fact that in countries where
the first scheme still holds, reformers have to agitate even to create the sense
of a problem in the public mind, and people are shocked when they discover
the supposed prevalence of illegal abortion4 1. The situation is indeed remote
from the visible breakdown of the law's symbolic effectiveness under Prohibition.
But all these considerations only touch the margin of the problem of symboli-
sing respect for life; further discussion must wait until we come to assess the
civilizational implications of the second and third schemes of regulation4 2 .
Still, the value of human life may provoke someone to ask, How effective is
this scheme in suppressing the maternal mortality and morbidity caused by
bungled abortions? Again, the answer must be very circumspect. It would be
reasonable to suppose that the incidence of maternal death is diminished by
adopting the third scheme of regulation, which encourages any woman desiring
an abortion to approach properly qualified persons43 . On the other hand, the
diminution is far from complete, since an element of risk pertains to this as to
all operations, and the total number of operations tends, as we have said, to
increase substantially 4 . As is shown in Appendix B, paragraph 2, the numbers
of deaths from abortions (lawful and unlawful) in Poland and Czechoslovakia
38. Cf. Rose, "Sociological Factors in the Effectiveness of Projected Legislative
Remedies" (1959) 11 Journal of Legal Education 470, stressing the lack of
research, but opining that even widespread violation of law need not, in certain
circumstances, diminish respect for law: id. at 474. Also Sternquist, "How are
Changes in Social Behaviour developed by means of Legislation?" in Legal Essays:
a Tribute to Frede Castberg (1963) 153-169.
39. On the Scandinavian debate about the law's effect in creating an "abortion
mentality" see Borell and Engstr6m, "Legal Abortions in Sweden" (1966) 13
World Medical Journal 72, 74; Ingerslev, "The Danish Abortion Laws" (1967) 7
Medicine Science & Law 77, 81; Tietze, "Abortion in Europe" (1967) 57
American Journal of Public Health 1923, 1927, and works there cited.
40. See the analysis of British statistics in Dickens, op. cit. supra n.7 at 73-106. In
S.A., 17 persons were charged with criminal abortion in the six years ending 30th
June 1968: see evidence of Inspector Turner, op. cit. supra n.24 at 16.
41. See Bates and Zawadzki, op. cit. supra n.313, at 3, and Guttmacher's Foreword,
id. at viii.
42. See text infra at nn.84-91.
43. See the analysis in Tietze and Lehfeldt, "Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe"
(1961) 175 Journal of American Medical Association 1149, 1151.
44. The total number of conceptions also rises: ibid. It is interesting to note that the
rate and proportion of abortions is higher among Japanese women who use
contraceptives than among those who do not: Samuel, op. cit. supra n.32 at 21.
On the risks of the operation see infra n.91.
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in 1964, after six full years of complete liberalisation, do not significantly
differ, when adjusted to population, from those for the United Kingdom
under the first scheme of regulation 45. Swedish commentators on the
second scheme of regulation have detected a fall in maternal deaths from
abortion, but have been unable to say whether this is due to anything other
than the increased availability of anti-biotics 46.
It is not the business of jurisprudence to offer opinions about the acceptability
or unacceptability of a given incidence of maternal mortality and morbidity.
But it can offer the following reminders. First, the reduction of maternal deaths
from bungled abortions, however desirable, is necessarily only a secondary aim of
the first scheme of abortion regulation. Secondly, the number of such deaths,
however calculated 47 , is minute compared with deaths from other human and
avoidable causes. The feasible reductions in maternal deaths obtainable by aban-
doning the first scheme of regulation are doubtless only a small fraction of the
reductions in deaths obtainable by governing the speed of vehicles to 50 m.p.h. or
regulating the consumption of tobacco. Thirdly, no woman need go to her
death at the hands of bunglers. To speak of the law driving women to their
deaths is none too enlightening. As the studies of Packer and Gampell in
California48, of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists in
England before the Abortion Act 49, and the evidence of the gynaecologists and
other medical practitioners who appeared before the Select Committee of the
S.A. House of Assembly5" all indicate, no woman whose life is in any way
45. For Poland, see Mehlan, op. cit. supra n.32 at 86; for Czechoslovakia, see Potts,
"Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe" (1967) 59 Eugenics Review 232, 242; for
the English figures and an analysis of them, see Report on Confidential Enquiries
into Maternal Deaths in England and Wales 1964-66 (1969, H.M.S.O.), digested
in [1969] 1 The Lancet 657; also Goodhart, op. cit. supra n.23 at 198-200.
46. Borell and Engstr6m, op. cit. supra n.39 at 74.
47. Most commentators in American law journals continue to accept a figure for annual
maternal mortality from abortion of 5,000-10,000. This figure has been denounced
by every competent enquirer as, in Tietze's words, "unmitigated nonsense".
Tietze, a statistician for the Population Council of New York and by no means
opposed to abortion, estimated that the number was 500-1,000: see New York
Times, 28 January 1968, 28 col. 3. The higher figures so widely and irresponsibly
publicised have no other basis than a claim, itself fancifully arrived at, by Taussig
in 1936. In 1934 there were 4,000 registered deaths from abortion p.a.; in 1968
there were about 400. See Hall, "Commentary" in Daniel T. Smith (ed.)
Abortion and the Law (1967) (Hall, passionately in favour of free abortion, thinks
500 a reasonable estimate). See also the careful analyses of deaths in Minnesota,
Michigan and Tennessee in (1967) 98 American Journal of Obstetrics and
Gynaecology 356-370; from these one can conclude that the figure for the U.S.
can hardly be higher than 600 p.a. and may well be nearer 400. Such a rate
corresponds well to the rate of one or two deaths officially reported as probably
due to induced abortion per annum in South Australia (see Causes of Death 1965,
Cth. Bureau of Census and Statistics, Bulletin No. 3 (1967) 42, 48). In his
evidence to the Select Committee of the House of Assembly, Inspector Turner
considered that the death-rate from illegal abortion was only about one every
four years: op. cit. supra n.24 at 17.
48. Packer and Gampell, op. cit. supra n.27.
49. The R.C.O.G. Report, supra n.22, begins by saying that "the present situation
[i.e. the first scheme as it obtained in England before 1967] commends itself to
most gynaecologists in that it leaves them free to act in what they consider to
be the best interests of each individual patient . . . We are unaware of any case
in which a gynaecologist has refused to terminate pregnancy, when he considered
it to be indicated on medical grounds, for fear of legal consequences." As to
South Australia, see infra n.50.
50. Op cit. supra n.24 at 19-20, 22-23, 31, 37, 39, 46, 50-51, 59.
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endangered need suppose that her gynaecologist will decline to operate for fear
of legal sanctions under the first scheme of regulation. Indeed, even if gynae-
cologists were even less liberal than they are, it would remain true, as is
universally admitted, that the cases where abortion is needed to save life, or to
preserve health from serious and lasting impairment, are today remarkably
rare5 1 . A society which has not surrendered to what Maurice Hauriou scathingly
called 1instinct du moindre effort52 would consider measures to alleviate
poverty, to disseminate sexual and birth-control information, and to publicise
the dangers of amateur abortion, rather than abandon or radically modify the
symbolising of its civilizational ideals and norms in order to accomplish a rather
small diminution in a category of mortality much less numerous and no more
sad, unpleasant or unavoidable than many others.
2. The "rights of the medical profession": broader medical criteria
and control by prior authorisation.
The second model scheme of regulation is that which, broadly speaking,
obtained until recently in Denmark and Sweden 53 . In this scheme, abortion is
permitted when previously authorised by official medical boards, which must be
satisfied that the case falls within one of a number of categories specified by
ample but not indefinite criteria of a medical, psycho-medical or quasi-medical
nature. Criteria and method of control are in principle, of course, independent
variables; but we may say that usually control by boards goes along with criteria
wider than in most versions of the first scheme.
This is the place to emphasise that the difference between the three schemes
is not to be read off the face of the relevant statute; the accepted interpretation
in each jurisdiction is the crucial determinant. If medical boards generally
interpret the permitted categories so as to allow abortions in all cases of
inconvenience, the scheme must be counted as approximating to the third, not
the second, of our categories. One can even conceive a statute intended to
effect the third scheme being so interpreted by a united medical profession
that it approximated in practice to the first scheme. The only legislative
51.. There is an extensive review of medical literature on this point in Quay, "Justi-
fiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations" (1960) 49 Georgetown Law
Review 173-241. The matter is no longer disputed, even in the polemical literature.
52. Hauriou, Prdcis de Droit Constitutionnel, xi (2nd ed., 1929), commenting on
Kelsen's jurisprudence.
53. It should be emphasised that these Scandinavian systems only approximate to
the second model scheme, since (1) the medical boards are only partly repre-
sentative of the medical profession, and (2) some of the grounds for abortion are
only partially medical. See Skalts and Norgaard, op. cit. supra n.30; Ingerslev,
op. cit. supra n.30; Hoffmeyer, "Medical Aspects of the Danish Legislation on
Abortions" (1965) 17 Western Reserve Law Review 529. Norway's system, since
1960, approximates to the British and thus to the third scheme: see Roemer
"Abortion Law: the Approaches of Different Nations" (1967) 57 American Journal
of Public Health 1906, 1914. The evidence before the Select Committee of the
S.A. House of Assembly revealed some widespread misconceptions, such as that in
Sweden there were boards manned by the village mayor, greengrocer, et al. Tietze
and Lewit, op. cit supra n.37 at 24, state that in Sweden, where most applications
for abortions were referred to the Royal Medical Board, a large proportion of
abortions are now performed on the recommendation of two physicians: i.e., the
third scheme has virtually been adopted.
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guarantee against such a breakdown in the third scheme would be to enact
that, where a woman persists in her demand, the physician shall be obliged to
perform an abortion. Such appears now to be the law in Hungary54 . Short of
this, legislatures cannot themselves define the limits of their scheme (whichever
it is) with complete adequacy and security. Nevertheless, legislation is irrational
if its aims are not clear and distinct, and our three model schemes do correspond
to distinct sets of aims of abortion regulation.
What are the aims of the second scheme? Three are commonly identified:
(1) to preserve the dignity, rights and freedom of action of the medical pro-
fession; (2) to recognise the right of the woman over her own body; (3) to
suppress unskilled abortions.
Each of these objectives is obviously aimed against a real or supposed
implication of the first scheme. Indeed, only hostility to that scheme could
prevent intelligent men from seeing that these three objectives cannot all be
maintained together. For in the first place, if the woman has the supposed
right over her own body, the medical profession (as represented by the board)
has no right to deny her the opportunity of getting a lawful abortion: so the
first and second objectives do not cohere. In the second place, there is no
natural necessity for the medical profession to share the reformers' enthusiasm
for reducing unskilled abortions at all costs; medical ethics may be so restrictive
!that many women will seek out unskilled abortionists: the first and third
objectives do not cohere. As we shall see, these observations are not abstract
quibbles; they delineate the main features of the Scandinavian experience.
Let us consider the first objective, often rendered as: "setting free the medical
profession"5 5. At the outset, an ambiguity must be brought to light. It is one
thing to set free the medical profession by giving its accredited representatives,
on carefully selected and balanced medical boards, the right to interpret medical
criteria in terms of medical science and professional ethics. It is quite another
thing to set "the profession" free in the sense of permitting any licensed practi-
tioner (or pair of practitioners) to carry out an abortion when "in good faith"5
6
he considers certain criteria fulfilled. In the former case, one is clearing the ring
for the reinforcing of the standards of the profession by the profession, by
providing formal mechanisms for authoritative expression of those standards.
In the latter case, one is subjecting those standards to a powerful solvent;
for if the profession were to attempt to take disciplinary action against a
physician who was acting within the penal law but outside the canons of
medical ethics and practice, the accused physician could with reason reply
that the policy of the law and society was precisely to set him free to act
according to his own conscience.
54. Tietze, op. cit. supra n.21, at 1149-50; Mehlan, op. cit. supra n.32; Potts, op. cit.
supra n.45.
55. The phrase, with all its ambiguities, is employed in Glanville Williams, "Euthan-
asia and Abortion" (1966) 38 University of Colorado Law Review 178, 196. Cf.
also Sands, "The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition" (1966)
13 U.C.L.A.L.R. 285: "The Therapeutic Abortion Act [Calif.] . . . attempts to
allow the medical profession to practice according to its highest standards in
spite of restrictive religious views."
56., This is the phrase in the Abortion Act 1967, s.1 (1) (U.K.), for which Professor
Glanville Williams must take some credit.
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These broadly opposed tendencies, corresponding to the two broadly distinct
senses of the ambiguous notion of "professional freedom", will remain effective,
though in varying degrees as complicating components are added to one legal
set-up or the other. For example, one could settle for medical boards and thus
for the maintenance of general professional standards; but the strengthening
effect on those standards would vary according as the boards were exclusively
or only partly obstetrical, exclusively or only partly medical, centrally or locally
selected, representative of State commissions or representative only of hospital
managements, and according as the criteria for decision were exclusively
medical, or partly psychiatrical, or partly "social", and according as the
decisions were required to be unanimous or only by majority. On the other
hand, one could settle for setting free individual physicians or hospitals; but the
solvent effect of this on professional standards would vary according as the
decision was left with individual physicians, or pairs of physicians, or committees
of hospitals, exclusively gynaecologists and obstetricians, or generally all prac-
titioners, and according as a "reasonable" or only "good faith" decision was
required, and according as the onus of proving conformity with the legal
criteria rested with the prosecution or with the defendant physician.
But since, as we said, the broad tendencies to maintain or dissolve professional
standards persist throughout the foregoing ranges of variations, it is fair to
say that any schemer8 (such as that of the "Abortion Act" 1969 (S.A.) or the
Model Penal Code59 ) which leaves the decision (in ordinary as well as
emergency cases) to anything other than centrally appointed medical boards,
by unanimous decision on substantially medical grounds, is a scheme which
57. On onus of proof, see George, op. cit. supra n. 11 at 392; Moore, "Antiquated
Abortion Laws" (1963) 20 Washington and Lee Law Review 250, 259; Quay,
op. cit. supra n.51, at 241; Louisell, "Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the
Due Process of Law" (1969) 16 U.C.L.A.L.R. 233.
58. Provided that it is introduced specifically to liberalize the first scheme. As to -uses
of the second scheme to tighten up a sagging first scheme, see text infra at
nn.73-75.
59. The Abortion Act 1967 (U.K.), the "Abortion Act" 1969 (S.A.) and the Model
Penal Code s.230.3 all leave everything to the good faith of two doctors. This simi-
larity is more important than the difference which appears from the fact that the
Model Penal Code authorises abortion only where there is substantial risk of grave
injury to the mother (infra n.72), whereas the Abortion Acts specifically distinguish
between grave injury and other injury, and expressly authorise abortion in the
latter as well as the former case: see infra Appendix A, para. 1. Packer and
Gampell's scheme for requiring authorization by hospital committees is announced
as an attempt to substitute "the institutionalized exercise of responsible medical
judgment for the hit-or-miss application of the criminal law": Packer and
Gampell, "Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in Law and Medicine" (1959) 11
Stanford Law Review 417, 455. The hospital committee scheme has been
adopted in the 1967-8 abortion legislation in Colorado, Maryland, North Carolina
and California: see Annotated Code of Maryland, art. 43 s.149E; Colorado Revised
Statutes, 40-2-50 to 53: Calif. Health and Safety Code ss.25950 to 25954; and cf.
N. Carolina, General Statutes s.14-45.1; see also "Survey of Abortion Reform
Legislation" (1968) 43 Washington Law Review 644; "Colorado's New Abortion
Law" (1968) 40 University of Colorado Law Review 297; Survey (1968) 43
Notre Dame Lawyer 684; Sands, op. cit. supra n.55. But the institutionalization is
basically feeble, in that the authorizing committees are subject to no central
appointment, direction or control; a hospital out to make money would need to
do no more than constitute itself a committee with "humane and progressive"
standards. Note that the great Japanese liberalization of 1952 was effected not
by extending the grounds for abortion in the Eugenic Protection Law of 1948,
but by removing the control of the District Eugenic Committees over individual
doctor's decisions: Blacker, op. cit. supra n.32 at 35.
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approximates to the third rather than the second of our three model schemes.
For the brute fact is that standards within the medical profession 60 (not to
mention the psychiatric profession) 1 , as distinct from the representative
standards of the profession, vary so widely in relation to the relevant questions
of medical and ethical propriety that getting an abortion will depend on no
more than a woman's eye for the liberal practitioner or hospital, and her
persistence in seeking an "authoritative" consent to her request after any number
of refusals (since unlike consents, refusals can never be authoritative or final
in such a scheme). Or perhaps the determining factor will be no more nor
less than a woman's wealth 62.
Scandinavian experience in these matters may now be considered. Skalts and
Norgaard have testified that under the 1937 Danish legislation (which came into
force in 1939), hospital physicians, gynaecologists and surgeons often considered
that the decisions of the official boards were too liberal, while many women
and their families and doctors considered the boards too restrictive. This was
ascribed to the fact that the physicians, gynaccologists and surgeons saw only
the cases in which consent was given by the boards, and not the cases in which
consent was refused; the tension is said to have disappeared since the intro-
duction of regulations requiring the submission of all cases to the boards,
including those cases ending in a refusal63. This explanation, which is not free
from ambiguities, must be taken along with the fact that in 1964, for example,
only 54 per cent of applicants were granted their request for abortion 64. Indeed,
during the later nineteen-fifties, there is evidence of "a more restrictive
practice of authorization" 65, presumably reflecting changing assessments of
medical and psychiatric realities in relation to the permitted categories of
indication66 . Moreover, Henrik Hoffmeyer has recognised that the liberalizations
60. When Packer and Gampell put eleven hypothetical case histories to California
hospitals, in only four did a majority of hospitals say that they would approve
an abortion, but in nine a majority of the hospitals thought that other reputable
hospitals would approve. On the difference in standards between family doctors
and gynaecologists, see Skalts and Norgaard, op. cit. supra n. 30 at 506. For the
difference between psychiatrists and gynaecologists, compare the Report of the
R.C.O.G., op. cit. supra n.22, with the Report of the Royal Medico-Psychological
Assoc. (1967) 199, Journal American Medical Association 199.
61. On the alarming differences among psychiatrists, see Niswander, "Medical Abortion
Practices in the United States" (1965) 17 Western Reserve Law Review 403,
414; Rosenberg and Silver, "Suicide, Psychiatrists and Therapeutic Abortion"
(1965) 102 California Medicine 407, 410, concluding that when a psychiatrist
recommends abortion, he is probably considering "socio-economic factors" rather
than psychiatric indications. For the effect of putting psychiatrists and social
workers on authorizing boards, see Ingerslev, op. cit. supra n.39, at 78.
62. H. L. A. Hart has attacked the unfairness of the first scheme, under which the
obtaining of an illegal but skilful abortion depends on one's wealth: The Morality
of the Criminal Law (1965) 47. How much more galling would be the system
under which the obtaining of a legal abortion depended on wealth!
63. Skalts and Norgaard, op. cit. supra n.30 at 506, 511; Ingerslev, op. cit. supra.
n.39 at 81.
64. Skalts and Norgaard, op. cit. supra n.30 at 513.
65. Tietze, op. cit. supra n.18 at 1163.
66. Thus Hoffmeyer, op. cit. supra n.53 at 536, comments on the development during
the nineteen-fifties of "a more objective and sober attitude on the part of officials
. . . adopted as it was realized that suicides and the development of chronic
psychopathology were rare" in many cases once supposed to provide indications
for abortion.
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he desires meet with "the problem . . .that doctors are not specifically qualified
to apply them ["social criteria"] and would certainly refrain from participating
• . . and many surgeons and gynaecologists certainly would refrain from
performing the operations" 67 .
In short, the Scandinavian concern has to some extent been to set free the
medical and psychiatric professions to apply representative (not individual or
merely local, however conscientious) standards of judgment; and change in the
law is feared because it would involve the division of the profession and a
clear threat to the maintenance of those very standards.
Clearly, the Scandinavian legislation does not recognise any distinct "right
of women to dispose of their bodies as they see fit". The boards' refusals to
terminate pregnancy are authoritative, and the criteria do not include the
wishes of the woman. So we can turn to the implications of the Scandinavian
experience for the third of the objectives commonly proposed for the scheme
of regulation: the suppression of unskilled abortions.
It is not generally denied that during the first ten years after the introduction
of an approximation to the second scheme in Sweden and Denmark, the number
of illegal and presumably unskilled abortions rose appreciably",. No-one asserts
that during the subsequent decade there was any greater decline in the number
of such illegal abortions than was experienced during a similar period in
countries, such as Holland, under the rigorous first scheme 69. Nor is this
surprising. The strict application of medical and psychiatric professional
standards by the medical boards must be well known in Denmark and Sweden;
it cannot escape the notice of women that only about a half of those who apply
will be granted an abortion. The formalities necessary to secure a sound
judgment according to national standards are not trivial; there is red tape70 .
So a great many women do not apply, and of those who do so unsuccessfully,
it is known that over 15 per cent subsequently obtain illegal abortions, despite
the general aid and dissuasive counsel which they have received from the
Mothers' Aid Centres in connection with their application 71 .
It is as well to be realistic here. The conception of an unwanted child
represents a failure for the woman and is a source of humiliation to her. Studies
in Amsterdam indicate that failures in birth-control methods frequently result
from lack of communication between the spouses, manifesting a disturbed
family structure72 . It is in this context of failure, mental isolation, shame and
dilemma that many women will decide to act. Formalities, the requirement of
67. Id. at 551.
68. Supra n.30.
69. Skalts and Norgaard, op. cit. supra n.30 at 519, opine that the number of illegal
abortions may have declined by 10-14% between 1954-1964; but a similar decline
seems to have taken place during the post-war period in Amsterdam, where the
first scheme is in force: Treffers, "Abortion in Amsterdam" (1966-7) 20 Population
Studies 295, 299-300. Tietze doubts whether there has been any reduction in
illegal abortion in any Scandinavian country: op. cit. supra n. 3 9 at 1927.
70. On Swedish red-tape, see Tietze, op. cit. supra n.26 at 1152.
71. Skalts and Norgaard, op. cit. supra n.43 at 516.
72. Treffers op. cit. supra n.69 at 308-309, contains a very detailed analysis and
demonstration of these facts by way of a variety of statistical indicia. On the
contraceptive practice of British women having lawful abortions in 1968, see
infra Appendix A, para. 4.
ABORT I ON
informing the husband, and fear of being "talked out of it" by professionals
3
-
all these must weigh in favour of an approach to unauthorised abortionists.
So the use of the second scheme to protect representative professional
standards is incompatible with the aim of reducing unskilled abortions, and
indeed may well increase such abortions and the consequential mortality and
morbidity. The second scheme, therefore, stands or falls with its aim of setting
the profession as a whole, through its representatives, free from all legal
restrictions save those generated by the representative professional conscience.
To use this scheme for other ends as well would be irrational, since it would
in all probability follow that none of its ends would be secured and all would
be prejudiced. The scheme often attracts favor as a moderate, pragmatic
compromise between the "extremes" of the rigorous first scheme and the
permissive third scheme. But the compromise is illusory; the essence of the
scheme is to set aside all the aims of the first and third schemes, and to replace
them with the distinct aim of preserving representative medical and psychia-
trical standards. If this point is not firmly grasped by legislatures, the resulting
schemes will simply get the worst of all worlds. The point was not grasped by
many of the British and S.A. legislators of 1967 and 1969, and has eluded
academic American commentators, who have almost all proposed schemes
which structurally approximate the second model scheme (in more or less
unstable versions), but which cheerfully profess all the aims of both the first
and third schemes as well74.
Moreover, it is not clear that even a regulatory scheme which firmly and
precisely sought to liberate and strengthen representative medical ethics would
succeed-at least if it were adopted expressly as an alternative to a functioning
first scheme. For the primary object of the first scheme is the protection of
innocent human life against deliberate or careless attack. So the adoption of
the second scheme might be taken to represent a judgment that the free
operation of professional standards is to be preferred to the foregoing objective
of the first scheme. (This judgment would be particularly undisguised if
society continued to impose its own standards on the medical profession in
respect of life other than foetal life, and operations other than abortions.) What
would be the effect of such a judgment on the professional standards them-
selves? At present, those standards happen to include the objective of the
first scheme. Would not some members of the medical profession be tempted to
conclude that society, in seeming to prefer the liberty of the medical profession
to the protection of foetal life, was willing to follow professional ethics however
they developed, even if they abandoned concern for foetal or other categories
73. The Danish Mothers Aid Centres are said to talk a number of women out of
getting an abortion; see Skalts and Norgaard, op. cit. supra n.30 at 516-17.
74. On Packer and Gampell's scheme see supra n.59. Compare the scheme in Moore,
op. cit. supra n.57 at 259. On the Model Penal Code scheme, see M.P.C. s.2 07.1 1
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); s.230.3 (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962); Barnard, "An
Analysis and Criticism of the Model Penal Code Provisions on the Law of
Abortion" (1967) 18 Western Reserve Law Review 540. The principal M.P.C.
criterion is "substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely
impair the physical or mental health of the mother". This weakens without clari-
fying the principle of the first model scheme, provides none of the institutionalized
safeguards or advantages of the stable versions of the second scheme, and on the
admission of the draftsmen themselves does not meet the problem of illegal amateur
abortions to which the third scheme is a plausible answer. On the confusion of the
South Australian legislators see infra n.1 10.
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of human life? Would not such conclusions (whatever their justifiability) be
likely, and might they not inspire attempts to revise medical ethics, not in the
light of the immanent norms of those ethics, but in accordance with presump-
tions about "social opinion". Would not such attempts threaten the very value
which the second scheme seeks to realise, namely, the orderly development and
functioning of an autonomous and respected body of medico-ethical standards?
All this is quite distinct from the further question, which we shall not here
pursue: Would society be happy with a medical profession that held itself free
to dispose of human life according to shifting and disputed criteria of pro-
fessional ethics, or that was encouraged to believe it had a general right to
develop its standards in these matters without any legal restrictions imposed
from outside the profession?
The symbolic significance, and hence the consequences, of the second scheme
would be quite different if it were adopted in order to prevent a development
observable in many Western societies: an uncontrolled drift from the first
scheme to the third by a process of official and unofficial interpretation and
practice together with a breakdown in the unity of medical ethics. In such a
situation, the second scheme would be an attempt, not merely to support
medical ethics against the wayward consciences of individual physicians, nor
merely to liberate respectable practitioners from fear of the variable rigour of
non-medical prosecutors, but also to strengthen a particular tenet of existing
medical ethics, namely respect for foetal life. In other words, the second scheme
could conceivably be adopted specifically to strengthen, rather than to depart
from, the primary objective of the first scheme. In this case, to ensure its success,
the adoption of the scheme would have to be generally recognized as clari-
fying and tightening up "the law", and not as liberalizing or "humanizing" it.
The boards would have to be selected largely from those representatives of the
medical profession known to favour the -traditional medical standards; more
weight would have to be given to gynaecologists than to psychiatrists and social
workers, and decisions to abort would have to be unanimous. The point could
be reinforced by appointing a public defender of the unborn child's interests,
whose duty would be to present to the board those facts about the applicant's
circumstances which otherwise might be suppressed by the woman's anxious
advocacy of her own cause. The consent of the husband would need to be
required 75, in order to stress the point that the law was not dealing with a mere
adjunct of the woman's body, but with the living human fruit of a familial
enterprise. Emergency operations without the permission of a board would, of
course, need to be lawful-but to prevent abuse of this facility, it might perhaps
be necessary to put the onus of proving reasonable belief in the existence of
such an emergency on the doctor or hospital concerned.
Whether the second scheme were adopted as a liberalization of the first or as
a tightening up, many of the foregoing technical questions would need careful
resolution. Given clear and coherent aims, technicalities are the law's means of
securing substantive rationality. The symbolic and practical significance of
technical devices is immense; most people see the aims and significance of the
law only through its technical operations. Onus of proof, unanimity of decision,
75. As it is not under the Abortion Act 1967 (U.K.) or the "Abortion Act 1969 (S.A.).
Cf. supra n.11. It is required under, for example, the Colorado statute of 1967,
supra n.59.
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representation of competing interests, verification of ex parte assertions, consent
of interested parties-these are the factors whose determination one way or
another will govern the efficacy of any version of the second scheme. One may
add that, if the liberalizing version of the second scheme (or, indeed, the third
scheme) be adopted, some further technical questions will need clear solution:
Will it be an implied term in a medical practitioner's contracts with his
employers (if any) and his patients that he will perform abortions in all situa-
tions where the law permits abortion? Will it be actionable negligence not to
suggest to a patient the possibility of an abortion in those situations where a con-
siderable number of practitioners would be willing to perform an abortion?
Should, for example, a surgeon be entitled to plead conscientious objection to the
performing of any authorised abortion, for purposes of criminal, professional and
civil liability76 ? If the first scheme is somewhat hard on medical practitioners
because of its want of precision (in some versions) and its uncertain application
in the hands of police and prosecutors, is there not as great injustice in any
version of the other schemes which, through failing to distinguish between the
permitted and the compulsory, leaves the practitioner who has a firmly
traditional conscience uncertain of his legal right to act according to it?
3. The "right of the woman": uncontrolled application of
indeterminate criteria.
The third scheme of regulation obtains, broadly speaking, in South Australia,
the United Kingdom, Japan 77, Russia and Eastern Europe. Here, abortion is
either formally or in practical effect permitted whenever it is performed by a
qualified physician 78 . The limiting case is where the physician or authorising
board must perform or authorise an abortion if the woman persists in her de-
mand (Hungary). But there are many variants short of this. The first scheme is
liable, as we said, to change gradually into the third wherever qualified
76. The Abortion Act 1967, s.4 (1) (U.K.) and the "Abortion Act" 1969 (S.A.) both
contain a conscience clause which extends only to "participation in any treatment
authorized by this Act", but which does not protect a physician in respect of any
duty to advise his patient nor in respect of "any duty to participate in any treat-
ment which is necessary to save the life or to prevent any grave permanent injury
to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman": s.4 (2). In both these
respects the conscience clause in Moore, loc. cit. supra n.74, is preferable. The
Model Penal Code has no conscience clause. The proposed Humane Abortion Act of
1967 (New York) would, it seems, have required courts to order abortion in certain
cases. "Comment" (1967) 31 Albany Law Review 290, 294. Could a judge plead
conscientious objection? In England, Geoffrey Howe Q.C. suggested to the Medical
Protection Society that the safe rule for members of the Society seeking to avoid
civil liability might be: "If in doubt, terminate!": "The Abortion Act in Practice"
British Medical Journal 14th February 1969, 437.
77. The Japanese Eugenic Protection Law 1948, as amended, provides that an abortion
can be performed whenever in the judgment of a single physician "it is feared
that continued pregnancy or childbirth will for physical or economic reasons
markedly injure the health of the mother's body". This is formally much stricter
than the U.K. and S.A. Acts: see infra n.l0, and Appendix A, para. 1.
78. Since Parliament expressly rejected any special qualifications for the required
second opinion, it must be regarded as the merest formality. Note that in East
European countries, abortions must be approved by a board, and in some countries
about 10% of applications are refused; but the fundamental fact remains that
"medical reasons for termination are uncommon, contributing 6% of cases in
Slovenia, 10% or under in Czechoslovakia; approximately 4% in Hungary and
only 1% in Rumania": Potts, op. cit. supra n.45 at 239.
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physicians are in practice permitted to perform abortions at will without fear
of prosecution or professional disciplinary proceedings. The second scheme is
liable to be converted into the third by extension of the grounds on which the
boards may authorise abortion, so as to include considerations remote from
medical or psychiatrical indications. Within the third scheme it is possible for
there to be central boards, or no boards; permissive or mandatory indications;
fee-paying requirements, or free service'9; stipulations of authorized hospitals,
or no such stipulations; compulsory sterilization as a condition of first, second,
third or subsequent abortions, or no such requirement; compulsory instruction
in birth control procedures, or no such provision; and other similar variations,
including many of those already mentioned in discussing versions of the second
scheme.
The aims of the third scheme are two: (1) to give effect to the rights of the
mother over her own body; (2) to eliminate unskilled abortions80 . Neither of
-these aims need be regarded as primary or secondary; each is by itself a
sufficient explanation of the scheme.
What is the meaning of the first aim? In both the first and the second model
schemes, recognition is given to the rights of the mother as against any rights
which the unborn child may have. But these schemes preserve the impression
that the problem is one of balancing competing rights; it is only where the
mother is medically gravely threatened that her rights are given precedence.
In the third scheme, on the other hand, the foetus has no rights as against the
mother, since its existence is strictly by her sufferance or at her will and
pleasure, subject only to her finding compliant physicians. Indeed, under the
third scheme the foetus is likely to be less protected as against the mother than
are other portions of the mother's anatomy. For by the Anglo-American
common law, no-one may consent to an assault upon himself; consent is relevant
only as a pre-condition of the lawfulness of physical interventions within the
context of lawful games or of medically indicated treatment s". To ask a
surgeon to cut off one's leg for no reason other than that one wants it off, for
example, to win a bet or to beg, does not legally entitle the surgeon to perform
the operation. This is not in itself a criticism of the third scheme, but underlines
its novelty and scope.
Sometimes it is argued that to adopt the third scheme would contradict the
common law rules recently developed in many American States, conferring
conditionally enforceable rights upon unborn children, even non-viable
79. If abortions are cheaper than contraceptives the results are predictable: on the
Japanese experience, see Blacker and Samuel, op. cit. supra n.32. Moreover,
effective contraception requires continuing effort: see infra Appendix A, para. 4.
In 1964, one third of the 184,000 Hungarian women legally aborted had had two
or more previous legal abortions: Klinger, op cit. infra n.80, at 471.
80. An orthodox but nuanced account of current doctrine in Communist states is
Solnar, "Contribution A la Question de la Criminalit6 de l'Avortement Provoqu6"
in Tribute to de Vabres, supra n.10 at 171. Also Tietze and Lehfeldt, op. cit. supra
n.43 at 1149; Wolinska, op. cit. supra n.35; Potts, op. ci. supra n.45, and
Mehlan, op. cit. supra n.32 at 87, both citing the preamble to the Russian
legislation of 1955; Klinger, "Abortion Programs" in Family Planning and Popu-
lation Programs (Proceedings of the International Conference on Family Plan-
ning Programs, Geneva, 1965) (1966), 465.
81. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965) 6; Perkins, Criminal Law (1957)
853; Fairclough v. Whipp [1951] 2 All E.R. 834.
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foetuses, in respect of negligently caused ante-natal injuries8 2. The argument,
as it stands, is mistaken. The law can, without contradiction or legal-logical
absurdity, confer legal personality on whatever it wishes, human or non-human,
-and under whatever restrictions and conditions it sees fit. For example, the law
could coherently confer a right of action upon a child as against its parents for
conceiving it in face of known risk of malformation. To say that legally the
child had a right not to be conceived would in no way carry the implication
that the child had in any sense existed prior to its conception. Similarly, it would
not be legal-logically absurd for the law to say that a non-viable foetus had no
right, as against its mother and her physicians, not to be aborted, but did have
a right, as against third parties, not to be negligently injured8 3. Of course, legal-
logical coherence and legal legitimacy are to be distinguished-the latter
concept, unlike the former, involves considerations of the law as a project
for social order, as a scheme of living, of co-ordinating human ends, and ends
with means. Even so, to point to the developing common law civil rights of
the unborn child does not of itself establish that the third scheme lacks
substantive legal legitimacy.
But the recent American developments of the law on ante-natal injuries by
third parties are not irrelevant. For the developments have been provoked by a
growing sense of the arbitrariness of the distinction between viability and non-
viability. To more and more judges it has seemed that there is no meaningful
stage, in the development of the child after conception, at which the child
could in commonsense be said to change from a "part" into something more
than a part of the mother8 4. We have already said that legal rights and per-
sonality could be conferred on the non-viable foetus for any reason or none;
what we are saying now is that, as a matter of fact, the conferment of these
rights and personality has in large measure been due to a judicial sense that,
again as a matter of fact (not of legal logic), the non-viable foetus is as
distinct from the mother as the viable foetus. It is this cultural fact about
educated opinion, not the question of legal coherence, that is important here.
82. On these developments see Gordon, "The Unborn Plaintiff" (1965) 63 Michigan
Law Review 579; Note: "A New Theory in Prenatal Injuries: The Biological
Approach" (1957-8)27 Fordham Law Review 684; Note, "The Impact of Medical
Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries" (1962) 110 University
Pennsylvania Law Review 554. All the authors predict the general triumph of
the new extension of tort and other civil rights to the non-viable foetus. The
condition on which the rights in tort are enforceable is, of course, that the child
should be born alive; but in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v.
Anderson (1964) 201 A.2d 537 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held unani-
mously that a mother could be compelled to submit to blood transfusions in order
to save her unborn child, despite her religious objections.
83. Indeed, the law which grants a child an action in respect of negligent injuries
caused while it was still non-viable, need not be expressed in terms of "rights of
the non-viable foetus" at all. It can be expressed, after the fashion of the civil
law systems in this matter, in terms of nothing more than a causal link between
the plaintiff child's condition and the defendant's wrongful act: see Gordon,
op. cit. supra n.82 at 590-91. Similarly, under existing law, the young foctus is
protected against abortion, but has no right to legal interment, can be handled as
a pathological specimen, and its untimely birth need not be registered: in South
Australia it is thought that these legal disabilities end at the 20th week of
pregnancy: see evidence of the Director-General of Medical Services, Adelaide,
op. cit. supra n.24 at 18.
84. In Smith v. Brennan 157 A.2d 497, 502 (1960), the Supreme Court of New
Jersey said: "The third reason for the rule denying recovery was the theory that
an unborn child was a part of the mother, and therefore not a person in being to
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For this fact provokes the question: What are the implications, for society
at large, of adopting the third scheme in preference to the first or second?
Such an adoption seems symbolically to devalue the primary objective of the
first scheme: the unconditional protection of human life, inside as outside the
womb, save where another human life is involved. Now this objective has two
components: the major premise is that human life is to be protected uncon-
ditionally, save where other human life is involved; the minor premise is that
foetal life is human life. One or other of these premises must be undermined
by adoption of the third scheme. Which will it seem to be? Will it not be the
major premise? For the minor premise is protected by the strong trend of
modern thought, in the light of improved biological knowledge of ante-natal
development and of the chromosomal determination of human characteristics
at the moment of conception, in favour of recognising the distinct humanity
of the foetus after conception, and in favour of denying the relevance (long-
since denied by medical science)s5 of "viability" or "quickening" or any other
notional stage in ante-natal growth. It is to this trend that the developments
in the law about ante-natal injuries bear witness.
The symbolic form of Western civilization is in large part what we 'have
called Western rationality, in which the generality of rules is highly valued.
We see this form of thought in the following passage from the influential
contemporary American moralist Joseph Fletcher:
There are common exceptions to the rule against medical homicide. If
one can be made at the beginning of life (abortion) why not also at the
end of life (euthanasia)? The one situation is no more absolute than
the other. There is no more stigma in the one than in the other 6 .
It so happens that the Rev. Mr. Fletcher is arguing in favour of euthanasia;
but the symbolic form and movement of his argument is what is of interest here.
The dialectic moves in the ambit of the rationalist symbols: "rules"-
"exceptions"; "if this, why not that?"; "the one, so the other". Once Western
rationality had differentiated itself from the traditional and charismatic symbolic
forms, it became a dynamic system with a keen sense, and low tolerance, of the
arbitary and anomalous. "Common exceptions" must be restated as a new
whom a duty of care could be owed. All the courts that have permitted recovery
for prenatal injuries have disagreed with that theory. They have found that the
existence of an infant separate from its mother begins before birth . . . Medical
authorities have long recognised that a child is in existence from the moment
of conception, and not merely a part of its mother's body . . . " See also,
e.g., Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222, 223 (R.I. 1966). In Sinkler v. Kneale
164 A.2d 93, 94 (1960) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said of Holmes J.'s
doctrine in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton 138 Mass. 13 (1884): "Judge
Holmes's real point d'appui for decision was that the unborn child was part of its
mother. This was undoubtedly the medical view accepted by the law at the time,
and it is precisely the view that has altered since." The court approved Bennett
v. Hymers 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958), in which the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire said that "the foetus from the time of conception becomes a separate
organism and remains so throughout its life." Holmes's doctrine was overruled in
his own State, in respect of a non-viable foetus, in Torigian v. Watertown News
Co. (1967) 225 N.E.2d 926.
85. See "Note" (1962) 110 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 554, 556 n.1 7 . On
the minor premise generally, see the debate between O'Connor and Noonan in
(1968) 13 Natural Law Forum 127-140.
86. Joseph Fletcher, Morals and Medicine (1955) 205. Compare the title of Glanville
Williams's article, "Euthanasia and Abortion", supra n.55.
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"rule", even if the old rule fares rather badly in the process. So, given the
increasingly apparent humanity of the foetus, it must be assumed that the
consequence of shifting to the third system of abortion regulation will be the
gradual displacement of the old rule, often expressed in the Christian humanistic
symbolism (which together with rationality comprises the symbolic form of
Western civilization) as "the sanctity of human life"8 . The eventual content
of a stabilised new rule, no-one can predict.
Some, preferring not to draw attention to the question of rights (which,
however, arises whether one likes it or not), rely on the alternative objective of
the third scheme: the elimination of unskilled abortions. Indeed, of all the
schemes the third seems best fitted for attaining this end. But quick results and
complete satisfaction, as we have seen8 8 , are not to be expected. Nearly a decade
after adoption of the third scheme, the hospitals of each Eastern European state
are filled with thousands of cases consequential on illegal abortionss". Mortality
and morbidity are probably9" lowered; but they are far from eliminated, not
least because the total number of abortions is considerably increased, and the
operation is not free from risk of complications and sequelae 91 .
Advocates of the third scheme must consider a further issue: How great is
their devotion to the rights of the mother or the elimination of unskilled
abortions, or both? The unrestricted availability of abortion may well lead, as it
has in Hungary, to a fall in the birthrate so great that the population begins
to decline quite rapidly. At a certain point such a fall in population brings
hardships and threatens the common economic and social good 92. Is the
availability of abortion then to be restricted, with consequential limitations on
the rights of the mother and probable increases in the number of unskilled
abortion? Does the abortion question ultimately involve no more than shifting
considerations of social welfare, or does it involve human rights-and if so,
whose? On the answer to these questions, too rarely pressed, depends the
clarity of aim, and consequential precision of means, which are the essence of
legal rationality.
87. Giannella raises the sensible (rationalist) question how it can be consistent (i.e.
just) to allow the destruction of three or four healthy foetuses i-n order to prevent
one defective, while convicting the doctor who kills an unexpected defective
after birth: "The Difficult Quest for a Truly Humane Abortion Law" (1968)
13 Villanova Law Review 257, 271. It is not clear why a full-blooded exponent
of the third scheme, like Glanville Williams, should purport to wish to use the
criminal law to prevent abortions after the first 16 weeks of pregnancy: op. cit.
supra n.55, at 196.
88. Supra at n.45.
89. See Appendix B.
90. Not certainly: see the comment in Appendix B.
91. Report of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, op. cit. supra
n.22 at 851; Milller, "The Dangers of Abortion" 13 World Medical Journal
(1966) 78; Yoshio Koya, "The Harmful Effects of Induced Abortion" (1966) 13
World Medical Journal 170.
92. The Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on Abortion (1939: U.K.)
recommended against extension of the grounds for abortion not least for fear that
it would lead to under-population (see s.2 32). In October 1966, Rumania repealed
its liberal abortion law of 1957; the preamble to the law of 1966 referred
primarily to "the great prejudice to the birth rate and the rate of natural
increase", secondarily to "severe consequences for the health of the woman":
see Tietze, "Abortion in Europe" (1967) 57 American Journal of Public Health
1923, 1931.
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4. The proper scope of penal law
"He who violently bloweth his nose bringeth forth blood" 93. To the proverbial
wisdom of Israel were added the words of Christ: "Neither do men put new
wine into old bottles, else the bottles break, and the wine runneth out, and the
bottles perish" 94. With a fanciful but vivid sense of relevance, the Christian
legal philosopher drew from these sayings support for the conclusion that the
law should not lay too severe a moral burden on weak men95 . Crime should not
be coterminous with vice. I do not think that any of the three model schemes
of abortion regulation conflict with this jurisprudential canon. In the current
phase of Western mores, a criminal law which forbade abortion in all circum-
stances whatever would perhaps offend against the maxim; but the form of the
first scheme operative in the law and practice of all relevant countries now
permits abortions whenever the life of the mother is in danger. Of course, this
scheme is too severe for many women, and they break the law. But there is no
evidence of widespread resentment against the law, spilling over as a result
into more general lawlessness. There seem to be no general criminal rackets
flourishing on the basis of illegal abortions and extending into other areas of
crime 9 6 . Unlike Prohibition, the abortion law, while undoubtedly causing some
of the wine to ferment in the bottle to the extent of many thousands of
violations of that law, has not led to any split in the wineskin of the criminal
law as a whole.
Are there any further jurisprudential doctrines, considerations or debates
relevant to the problem of legally regulating abortion? There seem to be two
candidates: (1) the doctrine of the American Law Institute (recently made use
of by the Abortion Law Reform Association of South Australia) that to use
the criminal law against a substantial body of decent opinion is contrary to
basic American traditions9 7 ; (2) the questions raised in the "Hart-Devlin"
debate about the proper scope of the criminal law9s .
This is not the place to offer a full discussion of the American Law Institute's
opinion: on its face it is a proposition within the ideology of American
democracy, not within jurisprudence. However, a few questions may be raised
in passing. Which is the body of decent opinion referred to, in the context of
abortion? Is it the representative opinion of the medical profession? Or is it the
93. Proverbs 30:33.
94. Matthew 9:17.
95. Both the texts were cited by Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 96,
a. 2, to support the view that the law should not suppress all vices.
96. The reasons for this lack of connection between abortion and organized crime
are analysed in Schelling, "Economic Analysis and Organized Crime" in Task
Force Report: Organized Crime 114, 124 (1967: ed. The President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice).
97. Model Penal Code a.237.11 at 151 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); also Leavy -and
Kummer, op. cit. supra n.10 at 138. This view seems to lie behind another very
popular, but weak and obscure, argument: that the law should not "make
hypocrites of law-abiding citizens": see Trout, "Therapeutic Abortion Laws Need
Therapy" (1964) 37 Temple Law Quarterly 172, 173; "Psychiatric Implications
of Abortion: A Case-Study in Social Hypocrisy" (1965) 17 Western Reserve Law
Review 435, 453.
98. Devlin, op. cit. supra n.81 (which contains a bibliography of the debate to 1964);
Hart, op. cit. supra n.62; Mitchell, op. cit. supra n.9; J. R. Lucas, The Principles
of Politics (1966) 172-75, 344-51.
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opinion of those women and practitioners who consider they have a basic
human right to demand and perform abortions at will? If it is the latter, why
does not the Institute's Model Penal Code contain a straightforward version of
the third scheme? If it is not the latter opinion, what is indecent about the
body of opinion? But more important, how conscientiously is the American Law
Institute willing to apply its principle in other areas? Would it have eliminated
the law against duelling, during the centuries before the law's eventual triumph?
Is the opinion of decent racialists to be protected by the principle? Looking at
the Bill of Rights, we are inclined to believe that American democratic
principles are somewhat richer than the American Law Institute would have us
believe; as Edmond Cahn remarked of the desegregation decision in Brown v.
Board of Education: "Here we see again the falseness of the popular belief
that, with regard to moral values, the law imposes only 'minimum standards' ".
As a useful principle, more than merely a culturally effective slogan, the
American Law Institute principle seems rather ramshackle. The same is true,
it must be confessed, of the "Hart-Devlin" debate, despite the fact that this
was sought to be conducted within the realm of jurisprudence proper. At the
beginning of the debate, the principle that society has the right to punish
immorality as such was opposed to John Stuart Mill's principle that "the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others"'10 0 . At the end
of the day, Lord Devlin's advocacy of the former view had been
reformulated1 01 :
Whether society should have the power to restrain any activity depends
on the nature of the activity. Whether it should exercise the power at
any given time in its history depends on the situation at that time and
requires a balance to be struck between the foreseeable danger to
society and the foreseeable damage to the freedom and happiness of
the individual.
Meanwhile, Professor H. L. A. Hart's advocacy of the other view had been
shifting, too: for him, Mill's principle comes down to little more than10 2 :
that the issue should be calmly viewed as one to be decided by considera-
tion of the balance of harm done by the practice and the harm done by
the existing law,
Between this "principle" of balancing and the "principle" of balancing quoted
from Lord Devlin, we find it difficult to see any difference. In the absence of
critical clarification of the concept common to both-namely, danger, damage
or harm-we feel free to say that the debate has neither strengthened nor
weakened our own analysis of the functions of the criminal law.
John Stuart Mill himself was able to recognise that the problem is not as
simple as some of his uncritical followers have supposed. One hundred years
ago, progressive and humanitarian thinkers in England were agitating for State
99. Cahn, "Jurisprudence" (1955) 30 New York University Law Review 150, 156.
100. Mill, Essay on Liberty (Everyman ed., 1910) 72-73.
101. Devlin, op. cit. supra n.81 at 113.
102. Hart, op. cit. supra n.62 at 47; also 48-49.
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registration and certification of prostitutes 0 3. The primary object of this scheme
was analogous to a main aim of the third model scheme of abortion regulation:
the prevention of venereal disease. But in his evidence to the Royal Commission
on Contagious Diseases' 0 4, in 1871, it was Mill who said that a licensing law10 5 :
facilitates the act beforehand, which is a totally different thing, and is
always recognised in legislation as a different thing, from correcting the
evils which are the consequences of vices and faults. If we were never to
interfere with the evil consequences which persons have brought upon
themselves, we should help one another very little. Undoubtedly, it is
true that interfering to remedy evils which we have brought on our-
selves has in some degree the same bad consequences, since it does in
the same degree diminish the motive we have to guard against bringing
evils on ourselves. Still, a line must be drawn somewhere, and a marked
line can be drawn there. You may draw a line between attacking evils
when they occur, in order to remedy them as far as we are able, and
making arrangements beforehand which will enable the objectionable
practices to be carried on without incurring the danger of the evil. These
two things I take to be distinct and capable of being kept distinct in
practice. As long as hospitals are not peculiarly for the class of diseases,
and do not give that class of disease any favour as compared with others,
they are not liable to objection, because their operation consists in
remedying the effects of past evils; they do not hold out a special
facility beforehand to practising illicit indulgence with a security which it
would not otherwise enjoy. The interference is not preventive but
remedial.
And then Mill was asked: "You think that the tendency of the Act'0 6 is to do
moral injury?" He said 10 7 :
I do think so, because I hardly think it possible for thoughtless people
not to infer, when special precautions are taken to make a course which
is generally considered worthy of disapprobation safer than it would
naturally be, that it cannot be considered very bad by the law, and
possibly may be considered as either not bad at all, or at any rate a
necessary evil.
103. Sheldon Amos, Laws for the Regulation of Vice (1877); Ann Stafford, The Age
of Consent (1964).
104. State-controlled facilities or licensing provisions obtained in almost every European
country and, in practical effect, in English military districts. In 1870 a Royal
Commission was appointed to inquire into the possibility of extending the quasi-
licensing provisions to all parts of England. At the outset, most of the Commis-
sioners, who included T. H. Huxley and F. D. Maurice, were in favour of such
an extension. But at the end of the day the Chairman was to say: "So far as
the medical testimony was concerned, there can hardly be a doubt that the
system of the periodical examination was the most efficacious for the restriction
of diseases. On the other hand, there were many considerations of morality and
decency which rendered the Commission unwilling to recommend it." Amos,
op. cit. supra n. 9 9 at 16, 47. For the conclusions of the Commission, id. at
478-496. On the Contagious Diseases Act 1864, id. at 423-471. On the Royal
Commission, Stafford, op. cit. supra n.99 at 43-51.
105. Quoted Amos, op. cit. supra n.103 at 53-54.
106. I.e., the Contagious Diseases Act 1864, 27 and 28 Vic. c.85, providing for
medical inspection of prostitutes in military districts in England.
107. Amos, op. cit. supra n.103 at 53-4.
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It is this more supple and far-seeing conception of harm that is relevant in
jurisprudence.
The problem of prostitution, like that of abortion, is not to be solved by
any legislative scheme alone; but throughout Europe experience of the pro-
gressive and humanitarian scheme for regulating prostitution showed that if
society regards something as a vice, it wilt generally be better to treat it as a vice
and not merely as a problem of health regulation like the sale of milk' 08 . If the
law speaks with a clear voice, it is easier to set in motion the educative and
alleviative programmes which are essential if the vice is to be checked at its
root.
To anyone who shares what have hitherto been the fundamental values of
Western society, an abandonment of the universal respect for the value of
human life must seem a harm-a change for the worse-not only to those whose
lives are lost as a result, but also to those who are persuaded to commit the
unjust killings: at the roots of Western moral thought is the conviction of
Socrates that the man who does an injustice hanns himself more than he harms
his victim; he makes himself less of a man, and thus altogether worse off' 09.
On the other hand, to someone who disputes these values in their application to
abortion, the first and even the second scheme of abortion regulation must seem
pointless and harmful. Between the two ranges of opinion there need be no
further jurisprudential issue; it is simply that the calculations or balances of
harm are drawn up with different weights.
The jurisprudential questions remain, whatever the fundamental values in
balance. Ends must be carefully clarified, and means related strictly to mutually
compatible ends, not to vague hopes, nor to compromises which in pursuit of
the immediately attainable lose sight of both the ultimately and the immediately
desirable" 0 . It is ominous that the most popular schemes in current
discussion happen to be compromises that muddle together aims and elements
of all the three model schemes, and so more or less obviously diverge from the
jurisprudential ideal of rational co-ordination of means with clear and coherent
ends. "Pragmatism", "codification of current practice" and "moderate reform"
are not synonyms for rationality; in much recent thought, they are substitutes.
108. Registration of Prostitutes is condemned by the Convention for the Suppression
of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others,
approved by United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 2nd December
1949. The Contagious Diseases Act 1864 was repealed in 1875, 38 and 39 Vic.
c.66.
109. Plato, Gorgias, 469B and passim.
110. In South Australia, the Select Committee of the House of Assembly, reporting
in favour of reform along the lines of the Abortion Act 1967 (U.K.), said (op. cit.
supra n.24 at para. 24): "Even though the general rule may be that there should
be no interference with a pregnancy, there are and always have been qualifications
for various reasons. The difficulty is to define them. The members of the Com-
mittee are agreed that any qualifications must be treated with the very greatest of
care. For the same reasons, they could not accept abortion on request . . . "(emphasis added). For the reasons given below in Appendix A, para. 1, the
Committee must be said to have deceived itself: the language of the Bill (as of
the Abortion Act 1967) in respect of "greater risk of injury to the physical or
mental health of the pregnant woman . . . than if the pregnancy were terminated"
is such that no medical practitioner need regard the Act as in any way "qualify-
ing" his right to terminate pregnancies on request (subject to some casual paper-
work). And this is the case quite apart from the "social clause" (scil. "greater
risk to the physical or mental health of . . . any existing children of her family
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Appendix A
NOTES ON THE ABORTION ACT 1967 (c.87. U.K.)
1. The Act draws a sharp distinction between two types of lawful abortion.
Emergency abortions are lawful when performed by a medical practitioner who
is of the opinion, formed in good faith, that an abortion is immediately
necessary to save the life or to prevent "grave permanent injury to the physical
or mental health" of the pregnant woman: section 1 (4). Other abortions are
lawful when performed by a medical practitioner, if any two medical prac-
titioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the continuance of the
pregnancy "would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman or any existing
children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated", or that
there is "substantial"' risk that if the child were born it would suffer from
such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped":
section 1 (1).
Not only (i) may the medical practitioners take into account a risk to the
health of persons other than the pregnant woman (and the unborn child), but
also (ii) in determining such risk to health, "account may be taken of the
pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment": section 1 (2).
When people speak of "the social clause" they may be referring to either (i)
or (ii) and very often to both.
It is the existence of the so-called "social clause" that perhaps more than
any other feature of the Act gives the average citizen, doctor and parliamen-
tarian the impression that the Act considerably relaxes or liberalizes the law on
abortion. This impression is of great social significance, and no doubt of itself
profoundly affects the working of the Act's scheme of abortion regulation. But
the fact is that in the first 13 months of the Act's operation, only 3.9 per cent of
lawfully notified abortions were stated to be on the grounds of risk to the health
of existing children' 12 . Far more significant than the "social clause" in this
sense, is the fact that the Act, by drawing the sharp distinction already
mentioned, sanctions abortion where the anticipated injury to health'13 is not
grave and permanent but slight and transient, and where the risk of such injury
is not substantial or serious but merely "greater than if the pregnancy were
terminated". This fact is emphasised by the printed form provided for certifi-
cation in accordance with the Abortion Regulations 1968114. The certifying
than if the pregnancy were terminated", and "account shall be taken of the
pregnant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.")-this clause
(or clauses) is less significant than the Committee (para. 20) seems to suppose.
111. In considering the meaning of "substantial", and the effect of the Act on medical
ethics, one will note that an editorial in The Lancet for 12th July 1969, p.89,
commended abortions at the 24th week of pregnancy in certain cases wherever
the risk of congenital abnormality is 1 in 10 or greater.
112. Sec. of State for Social Services, Parliamentary Debates (Houe of Commons),
16th June 1969, col. 9-13.
113. Note that in 1960, the World Health Organization defined "health" as "a state
of complete physical, mental and social well-being, not simply the absence of
illness and disease". Note also the looseness of the English requirements as against
those in the California legislation of 1967, where what is in question is "mental
illness to the extent that the woman is dangerous to herself or to the person or
property of others, or is in need of supervision or restraint": California Health
and Safety Code section 25954 (1967).
114. S.I. 1968 No. 390, Schedule 1.
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'doctors need do no more than sign the form, having ringed a number, for
example; "2. the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk of injury to
the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman greater than if the
pregnancy were terminated"; or "3. the continuance of the pregnancy would
involve risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the existing child(ren)
of the family of the pregnant woman greater than if the pregnancy were
terminated".
As C. B. Goodhart has said: "Since the almost non-existent risk to the life
of a healthy woman in an abortion properly performed early on in pregnancy
is indeed likely to be less than the present very low, but not wholly negligible,
risk in childbirth, it is hard to see how any doctor could justify a refusal to give
such a certificate. Whatever Parliament may have intended, this is in effect
abortion on demand, subject only to a doctor's right to refuse to participate
if 'he can prove a genuine conscientious objection"1 15.
2. The Act (which does not apply to Northern Ireland) came into force on
27th April 1968. From time to time since then, Ministers have supplied
Parliament with statistics based on the notifications required by the Act. These
statistics relate to England and Wales; Scottish figures are issued separately,
and are not included in the following table and commentary.
TABLE A116
I II III IV V
Cumulative Average daily
total at end Notifications rate within Equivalent
Period of period within period period annual rate
1968
27th April - 24th June
3,863 3,863 65 24,000
24th June - 8th October
13,042 9,179 87 32,000
8th October - 31st December
22,256 9,214 110 40,000
1968- 1969
31st December - 25th February
28,849 6,593 118 43,000
1969
25th February- 27th May
41,496 12,647 139 51,000
27th May - 1st July
46,714 5,218 149 54,000
115. British Medical Journal 4th May 1968, 298.
116. The table is based on figures supplied by Ministers: see Parliamentary Debates
(House of Commons) vol. 767, col. 184; 770, col. 84; 771, col. 192; 776, col .
137; 780, col. 10; 781, col. 199; 785, col. 9; Parliamentary Debates (House ot
Lords) vol. 304, col. 252.
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1st July - 30th September
60,585 13,871 151 55,000
30th September - 31st December
76,269 15,684 170 62,000
(2nd November - 29th November
- 5,171 185 67,000)
It is possible that some of the notable increase in the rate of lawful abortions
observable during the first 20 months of the Act's operation has been due to
an increased influx of women from outside the United Kingdom. However, it
seems unlikely that this is the major cause of the increase. In the period from
27th April to 31st December 1968, 5 per cent of women aborted in England
and Wales gave a place of residence outside the United Kingdom 17. In the
period from 1st January to 1st July 1969, the number -rose, but only to 7.3 per
cent of the total11 . Perhaps more significant (since it is impossible to estimate
how many women give false addresses) is the fact that the proportion of
abortions performed in National Health Service hospitals has remained virtu-
ally constant at about 60 per cent of all abortions being performed in England
and Wales. Indeed, while the proportion of National Health Service abortions
fell from 60.8 per cent in mid-1968 to 59.2 per cent in mid-1969, in the last
quarter of 1969 (in which the number of foreign women aborted rose to about
10 per cent of all lawful abortions) the National Health Service proportion
actually rose to 69.0 per cent. Since it is certain that only a negligible number
of foreign women are aborted in National Health Service hospitals, one would
expect any considerable, but otherwise hidden, increase in the influx of foreign
women to be reflected in a fall in the proportion of National Health Service
abortions. Such a fall has not occurred 119.
3. It is commonly supposed that the majority, even the great majority (the
most popular figure is 80 per cent), of women seeking abortion in modern
Western societies are married women living with their husbands. Many sup-
porters of reform use this supposition to support an argument that reform would
not occasion sexual promiscuity and a change in sexual mores120 . Whatever the
merits of this argument, which is not in question in this article, the supposition
has not been borne out by the evidence available, for the first time, since the
Abortion Act 1967 came into force.
During the first nine weeks of the Act's operation, only 45 per cent of women
aborted were married and living with their husbands. During the 13 weeks
117. Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 16th June, 1969, col. 12.
118. Calculation based on ministerial figures in Parliamentary Debates (House of
Lords), 15th July 1969, col. 252.
119. Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 16th June 1969, col. 12; 4th February
1970, col. 159; 9th March1970, col. 898.
120. See, e.g., Taussig, op cit. supra n.20, 388; Dickens, Abortion and the Law (1966),
111; Lowe, Abortion and the Law (1966), 8; Lucas, (1968) 46 North Carolina
Law Review 730; Comment (1968), 14 Wayne Law Review 1006, 1019; Moore
(1963), 20 Washington and Lee Law Review 250, 256; Note (1967), 7 Journal
Family Law 496; etc. Note that the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee
on Abortion (1939; H.M.S.O.) stated, in para. 37, that "both the mortality
statistics and the figures of cases treated in hospital show that the overwhelming
majority of abortions occur among married women".
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ended 31st December 1968, the proportion had fallen to a little over 43 per cent,
and over 47.5 per cent of the women aborted were single (the remainder being
widowed, divorced or separated) 121.
4. In a letter to The Lancet in 1968, Frederiksen and Brackett stated:
"From data presented for countries in which contraception is already practised
by a substantial proportion of the population, it appears that permissive
abortion laws may contribute more to a diminution of the effective practice of
contraception than to a reduction in the birthrate beyond the level already
obtained by contraception before the enactment of liberal abortion legis-
lation"'122. Be this as it may, since the Abortion Act came into force a good deal
of evidence has become available concerning the birth-control practices of
women seeking abortions.
Of one series of 1,000 women between 1964 and 1969, 30 per cent normally
used no method of birth-control and 48 per cent used none on the occasion of
unwanted conception 123. In a recent study of women who obtained lawful
abortions through the Birmingham Pregnancy Advisory Service, 45.8 per cent
normally used no method and 73.5 per cent used none at the time of con-
ception 124. Of the first 500 women aborted through the offices of the London
Pregnancy Advisory Service, 42 per cent normally used no method and 70 per
cent used none at the time of conception 25 . In the last-mentioned study, the
Hon. Medical Secretary of the Service stated that 60 per cent of the women
were single, but "only 8 per cent of the pregnancies resulted from a casual
union. Many an intelligent young unmarried woman has admitted that she
viewed taking oral contraceptives as a degree of commitment she was not
prepared for"'126. Nearly 12 per cent of the first-mentioned series of 1,000
women were doctors or nurses, a further 11 per cent were students or teachers,
and only 4 per cent were schoolgirls who might, perhaps, be expected to be
more ignorant of birth-control methods'2 7. The President and Hon. Secretary
of the Royal Society of Obstreticians and Gynaecologists stated in July 1969
that "evidence is accumulating that contraception among the young is an
irrelevance"128 .
5. Under a scheme of abortion regulation as relaxed as that adumbrated
by the Abortion Act, it might be expected that mortality (and morbidity) from
unlawful abortion would decline appreciably. This decline has been slow to
appear, as the following table indicates:
121. See Registrar-General's Quarterly Returns for England and Wales for Quarter
ended 31 December 1968 (H.M.S.O. 1969), 23; Parliamentary Debates (House of
Commons), 16th June 1969, col. 12.
122. [1968] 2 The Lancet 167.
123. Diggory, "Some Experiences of Therapeutic Abortion" [1969] 1 The Lancet
873, 875.
124. Id.
125. Abels [1969] 1 The Lancet 1051.
126. Id.
127. Diggory, loc. cit. supra n.123.
128. Letter to The Times, 23rd July 1969.
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TABLE B 129
Deaths notified as due to abortions induced for reasons








1968 January to April 6
May to December 16
The total number of notified deaths from all forms of abortion for the period
1st April 1968 to 31st March 1969 was 42, as against 36 for the same period
in 1967-8130.
As for morbidity occasioned by unlawful abortion, no strong evidence is
available yet. The sponsor of the Abortion Act stated in the House of Commons
on 15th July 1969 that admissions to the London Emergency Bed Centre for
spontaneous or incomplete abortions (a category which includes bungled
criminal abortions) were 870 in the first quarter of 1968 as against 1,363 in the
first quarter of 1966131. However, the Emergency Bed Service Annual Report
for 1964 indicated that many hospitals had a prejudice against abortion
admissions, preferring to leave them to the Emergency Bed Service 32. So the
decline since 1966 may reflect a change in hospital attitudes now that hospitals
are ready to perform twenty times as many abortions as in 1966.
6. Early in 1969, an unmarried student was aborted in a Scottish hospital.
The certifying doctors ringed the clauses on the certificate which concern
"greater risk to the mental or physical health of the pregnant woman . . . " and
"substantial risk of abnormality". In fact the foetus was more than 28 weeks
old, and after the abortion lived for nine hours, being discovered to be alive
when the porter carrying it to an incinerator in a paper bag heard its cries. At a
public enquiry into the affair, the procurator fiscal, representing the Crown,
suggested that, while the Act gave doctors a right to terminate pregnancy, it
did not take away from them the duty to take every step to revive a child who
might be viable. Not surprisingly, various medical witnesses opined that, since
the object of abortion normally is to prevent the child's survival, resuscitatory
129.. See figures supplied by the Minister of Health, Parliamentary Debates (House
of Commons) 18th October 1968, col. 192; Registrar-General, op. cit. supra
n.121 at 21. All these figures exclude a category of deaths due to abortion
notified to the Registrar-General without specifying whether induced or spon-
taneous. The triennial Reports on Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths,
supra n.45, confirm the substantial accuracy of the Registrar-General's figures.
130. Secretary of State for Social Services, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons),
16th June 1969, col. 12.
131. Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 15th July 1969, col 414. For more
complete figures, revealing a continuous decline in abortion admissions to the
Service since 1964, see Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 13th February
1970, col. 1658.
132. Dickens, op. cit. supra n.120, 116.
ABORTION
measures might not be in place. But the jury unanimously recommended, not
only (i) that legislation should be introduced prohibiting abortion when the
foetus is approaching or has reached the stage of viability, but also (ii) that
in all cases where an infant of or approaching or about viable age or
apparently or possibly viable is to be delivered by abortion, all facilities and
resuscitatory measures applied in cases of ordinary birth should be adopted 133 .
The oddity, not to say downright absurdity, of this well-meaning recom-
mendation may help to indicate how far the scheme of the Abortion Act 1967,
as concretely understood in the society to whose order or disorder it contributes,
diverges from substantive rationality.
Appendix B
ABORTION STATISTICS FOR SOME EUROPEAN STATES
1. In Table D there is a category named "other abortions". This term refers
to official figures for hospital admissions for all forms of incomplete, spon-
taneous, septic or missed abortion. Thus it includes a certain number of bungled
illegal abortions, but also a number of spontaneous abortions (i.e. miscarriages).
A very thorough recent study'3 4 of births and abortions in Belfast (where, it was
concluded, a negligible number of conceptions-at the outside, 1 per cent-
ended in illegally induced abortions )indicates that not less than 12 per cent
nor more than 17 per cent of all conceptions result in spontaneous abortion
(miscarriage) detectable by the woman concerned. In this population, urban
and well-serviced with state hospitals, just under 12 per cent of all conceptions
resulted in an abortion for which medical treatment was given. In 91 per cent
of cases, this treatment was in hospital, even though of the women treated in
hospital only 25 per cent passed any part of the foetus itself in the hospital.
From this study, and others, it is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that not
more than about 12 per cent of all conceptions could (on account of spon-
taneous abortion or miscarriage) call for hospital treatment of any kind'3 5.
133. "Death of a Baby-Inquiry in Glasgow", British Medical Journal 14th June 1969,
704, 705. In a letter to The Times after the inquiry (2nd June 1969), Professor
Glanville Williams suggested that abortions after the 24th week of pregnancy
should not be lawful except in real emergency. Cf. supra n.87. The 1967 California
law draws the line at 20 weeks: California Health and Safety Code sec. 25953. Note
that in the first seventeen months of the U.K. Act's operation, 63.1 per cent of the
foetuses aborted were aged 12 weeks or less, and 35.4 per cent were
aged 13 weeks or more: see Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 10th
February 1970, col. 336.
134. Stevenson et. al, "Observations on the Results of Pregnancies in Women resident
in Belfast" (1959) 23 Annals Human Genetics 395, 396. See also Warburton and
Fraser, "Spontaneous Abortion Risks in Man" (1964) 16 American Journal Human
Genetics 1, 2; Tietze, Guttmacher and Rubin, "Unintentional Abortion in
1,497 Planned Pregnancies" (1950) 142 Journal American Medical Association
1348, 1349.
135. In England and Wales in 1964, there were about 850,000 live births, an unknown
number of illegal abortions (not less than 10,000) and 75,000 cases of abortion
(of all kinds) treated in National Health Service hospitals, plus a small number
treated in private clinics. These figures tally well with the Belfast depth-study, and
suggest that the figure of 12 per cent (conceptions ending in hospital treatment
for non-induced abortion) is a high maximum which in many areas and populations
might be (as in Czechoslovakia and Poland it is known to be) considerably lower.
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This enables a rough calculation to be made of the proportion of the "other
abortion" cases, reported in the East European statistics, which should be
ascribed to illegally induced abortions. The number of conceptions which might
have ended in spontaneous abortion is calculated by adding to the number of
births the whole of the number of "other abortions". (Conceptions ending in
induced abortion, legal or illegal, can be ignored because, in the event, these
cannot have ended in spontaneous abortion). The proportion of this number
of conceptions that might be expected to have ended in spontaneous abortion
calling for hospital treatment is, as a maximum, 12 per cent. (The resulting
figure may in fact overstate the expected number of spontaneous abortions
calling for hospital treatment, since the number of conceptions used as the
basis of the calculation in fact includes conceptions which ended in -illegally
induced abortion calling for hospital treatment.)
Thus, in Hungary in 1964, for example, with 132,100 live births and 34,300
"other abortions", one would expect that no more than 19,000 women would
have spontaneous abortions calling for hospital treatment. So it is not unreason-
able to suppose that the other 15,000 women who had hospital treatment for
abortion (other than legally induced abortion) were victims of illegal abortions.
In Czechoslovakia and Poland, no calculation can be made on this basis,
since the figures for "other abortions" show that it has never been the case,
in these countries, that 12 per cent of all conceptions resulted in spontaneous
abortion resulting in hospital treatment, and there is no way of determining
the relevant lower proportion from the figures available. One can, however,
observe that in neither country has the proportion of "other abortions" to
conceptions (i.e. to conceptions other than those known to have ended in
induced abortion) fallen significantly, if at all, between 1953-54 and 1963-64,
despite the falling birthrate and the legalisation of abortion.
2. What about deaths registered, in these countries, as due to illegal
abortion? Mehlan's figures are often cited 136 :
Poland 1959, 76; 1965, 26
Czechoslovakia 1959, 53; 1962, 11
Hungary 1959, 83; 1964, 24.
These figures cannot, however, be relied on. Potts, a passionate advocate of
free abortion, has cited the analyses of the Czech figures made by Lukis 137 and
by Cernoch138 : Potts states that Cernoch's are based on the more thorough
analysis13 9. Where Mehlan states that deaths from illegal abortion in Czecho-
slovakia in 1959 numbered 53, and in 1962, 11, Luk~s puts the figure for
1959 at 14, and for 1962 at 15, while Cernoch puts them at 10 and 9
respectively. The contrast drawn by Mehlan thus evaporates. It will also be
noticed that in Czechoslovakia in 1962 the ratio of those deaths to live births
was (assuming only 9 deaths) about 1:24,000 and in England about 1:28,000.
136. Mehlan, op. cit. supra n.32 at 86; Roemer, "Abortion Law: the Approaches of
Different Nations" (1967) 57 American Journal Public Health 1906, 1912.
137. Lukis, "Abortion in Czechoslovakia" in Sex and Human Relations (International
Planned Parenthood Federation Conference, 1965) 93.
138. Cernoch, "Les Autorisations d'interruptions de grossesse en Tch6choslovaquie"
(1965) 160 Gynaecologia 293.
139. Potts, op. cit. supra n.45 at 242.
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140. See Tietze, "Induced Abortion and Sterilization as Methods of Fertility Control"
(1965) 18 Journal Chronic Diseases 1161, 1163; Tietze, "Abortion in Europe"
(1967) 57 American Journal Public Health 1923, 1928; Tietze and Lewit, op. cit.
supra n.37 at 24; The Lancet, 7th February 1970, 291.
141. See Tietze and Lehfeldt, "Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe", (1961) 175 Journal
of the American Medical Association 1149, 1150; Tietze, opera cit. supra n.134 at
1928 and 1166; Rocznik Statystyczny 1964 (Warsaw, 1964), 41; Klinger, op. cit.
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NOTES ON THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN "ABORTION ACT"
1. This Act, the Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1969
(No. 10'9 of 1969), is substantially identical to the Abortion Act 1967 (U.K.).
supra n.80 at 475; Potts, op cit. supra n.45; Mehlan, "The Socialist Countries of















































































So the comments on that Act in Appendix A, para. 1, are applicable to the
South Australian statute.
There are two significant differences of detail between the South Australian
and the English provisions. (i) Unlike its model, the South Australian statute
specifies that the two medical practitioners whose opinion is a condition
precedent to a lawful abortion, must have formed this opinion "after both
have personally examined the woman". This is a clear improvement on the
English statute. (ii) In the English statute, an emergency abortion by a
single medical practitioner is authorised "where he is of the opinion, formed
in good faith, that the termination is immediately necessary to save the life
or to prevent grave permanent injury . . . " (s.1(4)). Correspondingly, the
conscientious objection clause (s.4) does not "affect any duty to participate in
treatment which is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent
injury . . . " These provisions are adopted in the South Australian statute,
but the phrase we have italicised is in both cases watered down to "grave
injury". This appears to weaken the scope of the protection afforded by the
conscience clause, and is regrettable. The Parliamentary Draftsman defended
his deletion of "permanent" by suggesting that "grave permanent injury" might
exclude the case where the injury might cause death. But even if death is not
to be counted as a "permanent injury" (sed quaere!), the case of risk of death
is amply covered by the conjoined phrase "to save the life".
2. At the time of writing, three sets of figures had been published 1 42, covering
the first 88 days since the Act came into force in 8th January 1970. On the
basis of these figures and on the assumption that the number of women of
child-bearing age in England and Wales is about 42 times greater than in
South Australia 143, the following table can be constructed.
TABLE E
II III IV V
Equivalent Daily
Average Daily Rate for Population
Notifications Rate within of the size of Equivalent Annual
Period within Period Period England and Wales Rate for S.A.
1970
8th January - 25th February
64 1.33 56 485
20th February - 22nd March
54 2.16 91 788
23rd March 7th April
44 2.75 115 1,004
Column IV is included to facilitate comparison with Table A, column IV.
This comparison shows the remarkable similarity between the South Australian
and the English experience, as regards both the absolute rate of lawful
abortions and the increase in this rate. The increase has, so far, been more rapid
and marked in South Australia.
142. See The Advertiser, 26th February and 24th March 1970; The News, 8th April
1970.
143. See supra n.26.
